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THESIS

**COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO TERRORISM IN
INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES**

by

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December 2003

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RESPECT TO TERRORISM IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES**

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ABSTRACT

Southeast Asia is experiencing tremendous changes both politically and economically. Religious and ethnic issues have increased significantly. The move away from traditional to modern systems creates a degree of instability, eroding the existing system's socioeconomic and politico-psychological tenets, giving rise to counter-elites and opposition groups, and paving the way for a resurgence of racial terrorism and ethnic animosities.

Although unfamiliar with insurgencies, Southeast Asia, long considered the "Islamic periphery" owing to its moderate Islamic stance, pluralism and nationalism, is facing a more complex challenge. The root causes of terrorism, both domestic and international, are varied and complex. Some factors are essentially ideological, economical and include religious and ethno-nationalistic extremism.

An adequate response requires counter-terrorist policies to interact with broader foreign policy. To be effective, counter-terrorism demands understanding the terrorist's psychology, motivation and goals. Multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) assist in forging substantive agreements that will enhance the sharing of information, tighten border agreements, and reinforce law enforcement cooperation. For example, the United States-ASEAN joint declaration on counter-terrorism, among other goals, pledges to share intelligence, block terrorist funds, tighten borders, and crack down on forged travel documents.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, drugs, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national boundaries and undermine economic stability and political stability in many countries.

President William J. Clinton

Viewed from either the global or regional perspective, Southeast Asia provides a disappointing picture in every social, economic, and political context. This is based on the fact that Southeast Asia is almost perpetually plagued by various intra-and interstate conflicts and crises stemming from myopic attitudes of largely illiterate masses and the weak approach the ruling elite adopts toward resolving problems. Virtually every Southeast Asia country's progress is hindered by internal conflicts and crises based on narrow considerations of caste, religion, ethnicity, language and community. This distorts the national integrity/unity and the overall order of the effected state. Moreover, a constant and often excessive preoccupation with domestic problem renders some states highly vulnerable to external threats and interference, which also challenge their sovereignty and consequently also challenges their legitimacy. In other words, the persistence of multifarious problems, both within and between the Southeast Asian states, hamper the sustaining of an environment wherein the basic essential needs of the common good are fulfilled.

Since the end of the Cold War, threats to international security have become less direct and apocalyptic. Today threats are more diffuse and insidious. The international community through the 1990's and into the next millennium faces a set of challenges that is as complex as it is novel. With the probability of the large-scale, high-intensity conflicts decreasing, terrorism and transitional organized crime constitute the most serious and most likely threats. Religious fanaticism, ethnic-nationalist conflicts, political ideologies, wide- spread poverty, unemployment, and social alienation are factors that have always propelled individuals and groups into terrorist campaigns.

A transnational threat can only be met with a transnational response. The internal security of an affected nation no longer ends where the sovereignty of this very nation

starts. In the attempt to combat the transnational phenomena of international organized crime and terrorism, the international security requires an improved transnational dimension.

Most of Southeast Asia is a developing region, typified by a lack of maturity in promulgating national, regional, and international policy. This region is vulnerable in facing global changes. In contrast, advanced societies of today are, to a great extent, dependent on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information. The amount of data in this process increases daily. The possibilities of disruption of information systems through viruses or electronic sabotage and the ability of groups (especially Mafia-type and terrorist groups) to obtain funds by electronically penetrating system (in an attempt to obtain information on possible targets) opens up the dimension of terrorists using information warfare. This condition jeopardizes Southeast Asia as a whole. The data shows that terrorism remains a serious threat in many countries, not surprisingly, given that the underlying causes of the bitter ethnic and religious struggles that spawn terrorism remain unresolved. Since the World Trade Center attack of September 11, 2001, international terrorists have proven that they have become the real threats to humanity. Many countries have taken various defensive actions, but with little effect. This failure was confirmed when only a year later terrorists committed a deadly act in the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002. The data show that from January 1999 to February 2003, Indonesia endured 15 bomb attacks in various important places.¹

In order to explain the rationale for such alliances, this analysis will explore the following questions:

- What are the characteristics and means of transnational terrorism (Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah)?
- What appropriate counterstrategies can meet such transnational threats?

While the face and origins of terrorism have changed over time, for a long period its essential aims and techniques have changed little, that is: “Kill one-frighten a thousand.” Southeast Asia is the region where rapid economical and political changes have arisen with simultaneous advancements in communications and technology. These developments not only stimulate closer contacts with global markets, but also facilitate

¹ Indonesian White Paper, “Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21,” pp. 31-32.

linkage between criminal organizations and joint ventures, namely al-Qaeda terrorism and the Jemaah Islamiah network. The terrorists' belief that they can use and exploit computers and telecommunications technology for criminal activities has increased dramatically. Any kind of cooperation and counter-strategy ultimately will depend upon the willingness of governments to allocate both human and financial resources to combat and to prevent transnational terrorism and organized crime. By considering the grave threat that transnational organized crime poses to world security, the international community must begin to develop procedural and operational mechanisms to combat the problem on an adequate scale.

In Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, separatist and extremist groups use terrorism because it is much more effective in undermining fragile governments. The United States has moral obligations to assist these fragile governments in defeating terrorism. However, in providing military and financial assistance to Southeast Asian governments, the United States must strike a balance between U.S. national interests in the short-term cooperation in the war against terror, and the long-term goal of developing viable governments that respect and uphold human rights and the democracy norm.

The September 11th and the Bali bombing seemed to clarify the goals of the counterterrorist mission-preventing harm against innocent civilians by eliminating terrorist attacks. However, this appears to invite a narrow focus for U.S. and Southeast Asian countries' counterterrorism policy in that success or failure is determined simply by body counts, whether it is that of the guilty or that of the innocent. However, reality is not so clearly defined. Political or economic pressure can change the behavior of government, which in turn eliminates the rationale for a group to pursue terrorism. In this case, counterterrorism must be viewed as a multifaceted instrument that may not necessarily realize immediate results. In dealing with international terrorism, counterterrorist policies must be afforded a prominent place in the overall U.S. and Southeast Asia countries' foreign policy.

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine terrorism in Southeast Asia, with particular attention paid toward terrorism conducted by separatist groups in Indonesia and

the Philippines. Furthermore, this thesis will discuss what actions are needed to contain counter-terrorism in the region. Additionally, this thesis will examine the U.S. government anti-terrorist/counterterrorist policy and how that policy is affected by growing political terrorism in the region.

In order to respond to the thesis question, I will apply the methodology of research theory and explore what recent problems are facing Southeast Asia. First, I will examine research about the political issues that leverage the development of the national and regional security. Secondly, to support the analysis, it is necessary to compare the economic development and political affairs in Southeast Asia while paying prominent attention to Indonesia and the Philippines. Finally, my analysis will focus on the main cause of transnational terrorism with respect to Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiah and how to best counter it. To counter transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia, I will explore and compare national, regional and international policy, particularly focusing on the U.S. policy.

A. ABOUT DEFINITIONS: TERRORISM IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE

While the problem posed by terrorism has received serious global attention, the international community has not yet formulated a uniform definition of terrorism. The saying, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” remains a common perspective on the definitional problem of terrorism. Foreign relations even indicate that “though most people can recognize terrorism when they see it, experts have had difficulty coming up with an ironclad definition.”

The Terrorist Research Center admits that terrorism “by nature is difficult to define”. The following definitions are provided by various experts in the field:

- Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individual or groups, to modify their behavior or politics. -Vice President Task Force, 1986.
- Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against a person or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. -FBI Definition.

- Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience. - James M. Poland.
- Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted. -Walter Laqueur.
- Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.-Brian Jenkins.

Paul Pillar, a former CIA deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism Center defines terrorism in the context of four elements:

- It is premeditated and planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage,
- It is political-not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the Mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order,
- It is aimed at civilians-not military targets or combat-ready troops,
- It is carried out by sub-national groups not by the army of country.²

The U.S. definition of terrorism, despite its inadequate conceptualizations, have influenced many scholars and analysts. For example, Dr. Boaz Ganor, an Israeli expert on terrorism, defines terrorism as the intentional use of, or threatened use of violence against civilians or against civilian targets in order to attain political aims³.

In an attempt to clarify the term terrorism, Ganor differentiates guerrilla warfare from terrorism and briefly defines the state's involvement in terrorism.

On the issue of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, Ganor contends that the two concepts serve as "alternative designations of the same phenomena." However, he emphasizes that "the term terrorism has a far more negative connotation, seemingly requiring one to take a stand, whereas the term guerrilla warfare is perceived as neutral and carries a more positive connotation."⁴ If terrorism purposely targets civilians in order to achieve political goals, Ganor regards guerrilla warfare as "purposeful targeting of military personnel and military installations in order to achieve a political goal."

² Quoted in Council on Foreign Relations, "Terrorism: An Introduction" at [<http://www.terrorismanswers.com/introduction.html>], Accessed on March 3, 2003.

³ Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" at [<http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm>]. Accessed on February 26, 2003.

⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

What is the meaning of terrorism in Southeast Asia? When Association Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members signed the 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (DJACT) on 5 November 2001, they did not clearly define terrorism. The declaration only describes “terrorism” as a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020.⁵ Terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security, which requires concerted actions to protect and to defend all peoples and to maintain the peace and security of the world.⁶ The ASEAN summit only urged ASEAN members to “intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region.”⁷

B. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

The nature of terrorism exhibits the following elements:

- Terrorism is an international act
- A premeditated act
- An act of violence
- It causes fear
- It aims at a specific target audience or society
- It intends to change behavior in that audience or society.

Terrorism is a political act, the goal of which is to make a change. The terrorist is not driven by personal desires or ambitions.⁸

Terrorism is about impacting society. There are three types of terrorist attacks (1) attacks that involve weapons of mass destruction, (2) weapons of mass casualties and (3) weapons of mass disruption. These distinctions are made to focus on the intent of the terrorist act rather than the means.⁹

A weapon of mass destruction is a weapon that causes damage to buildings, dams, bridges, computer systems or other structures of society. A weapon of mass casualty is a

⁵ [www.aseansec.org/4960.htm].

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN summit, see [http://www.aseansec.org/13154.html].

⁸ Delaware Criminal Justice Council Terrorism Research Page, p. 2.

⁹ Ibid.

weapon that causes massive sickness death or both. Biological and chemical weapons are weapons that are generally referred to as weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass disruptions are weapons that cause social, political and/or economic damage to society. Magnetic pulse weapons (to disrupt computer operations), agricultural terrorism (disrupt food supply or manufacturing) or cyber terrorism (hacking into computers and destroying bank records or government records) are examples of weapons of mass disruption. The distinctions explain how terrorist goals can be achieved, and they also illustrate that not every violent acts is necessarily terrorism. A terrorist act can involve a weapon that achieves all three goals, as in September 11th. The attack was one of mass destruction of infrastructure (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), mass casualties (an estimated 3,000 people died) and mass disruption (airports were shut down. This resulted in new laws passed, heightened fear of future attack and the loss of millions of dollars due to the loss of the WTC as an economic center.¹⁰

The nature of terrorism is the indiscriminate and indirect targeting of individuals with a specific goal and purpose. Terrorism is indiscriminate, in that people killed are not targeted specifically and are of no account to the terrorist; however, the fact that people are killed is of consequence. Terrorism is not an irrational act. The targets are chosen because they will cause the desired impact (either the destruction of infrastructure, causing massive death, or disruption of society). The nature of modern terrorism is that anyone can be a victim, but terrorism is not random, but causes public anxiety and fear and changes in behavior, which are exactly what the terrorist wants to accomplish. Terrorism is also a public act. The act must be such that the greater society will see it and react to the attack. The terrorist may choose targets that have symbolic value or economic value (WTC for example) or targets that have public value (busses, restaurant, etc.) in order to gain public attention and to change public behavior.¹¹

Terrorism should not be confused with traditional warfare. In war, the target is selected for its military value. In war, groups of people are selected for attack because the people themselves have some specific value and attacking the group will achieve a specific military objective. In terrorism, the group is of little account, but the fact that

¹⁰ Delaware Criminal justice Council Terrorism Research Page, pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Ibid.

they are killed is the point. Terrorism should not be confused with war crimes. An example of a war crime is an army advancing into some town with the objective of purging the town of enemy forces, and while doing so they kill unarmed civilians and noncombatants. Although such action is illegal and a crime, it is not considered terrorism; people were killed because the destruction was designed to intimidate other towns or the society as a whole. In distinguishing the difference between war and terrorism, the focus is on the reason for the attack and the impact of the attack, not the target of the attack itself.

Therefore, terrorist should be understood as a political act to achieve a desired goal through the use of violence. Terrorism is not an irrational act committed by the insane. The terrorist does not act for personal gain or gratification, thus the terrorist is not a criminal in the traditional sense. The terrorist believes in what he or she is doing. The objective is worth the life of the terrorist and the lives of the people taken. The intent is not merely to kill those who die in an attack, but to affect the larger society as a whole. An attack can be committed to destroy the building and operations of a society, to kill or injure people, or to disrupt the peaceful existence of the society. The attack can seek to achieve all three or a combination of the three. The objective can be to force the government to negotiate or to seek revenge for some government action. Terrorism does not seek specific victims but it does seek out specific targets for a specific outcome.

C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

1. Introduction

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is being pursued in an environment in which local factors supports the terrorist goals. Increased efforts are needed to pursue law-enforcement measures in regional states – a task which is likely especially difficult in the case of Indonesia. Through the 1990's, the international community faced a set of challenges, however, these more “traditional” and familiar types of ethnic/nationalist-separatist and ideological organizations were joined by a variety of “entities” with arguably less comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations.

However, further attention will also be needed to alleviate the social and economic disadvantage which has fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions such as the Southern Philippines. A Transnational terrorism threat can only be met with a

transnational response. The internal security system of an affected nation no longer ends when the authority of this very nation starts. Efforts to combat the transnational terrorism, the international security need international cooperation and broader dimension.

2. The Characteristic of Terrorism

By following an analytical/inductive approach, I will identify the trends of terrorist activities in the past and provide an outlook for the kind of terrorism that is likely to lie ahead. In an attempt to predict future developments in the sphere of terrorism, the analysis of recent trends will focus on three aspects: The tactics and weapons used by the transnational /international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah throughout the past decades, the targeted victims and the lethality of the terrorist acts.

3. Terrorism in Southeast Asia with Respect to Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda in Indonesia (Case Study)

The salient features of contemporary transnational organized crime and terrorism will be introduced. While avoiding a single devil's theory of cause, this chapter will focus on the rise of transnational terrorism with regard to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah and its increasingly national dimension within Indonesia. Further, the analysis will focus on the national and regional economic aspects as main factors of the emergence of transnational Southeast Asian terrorism. Any serious attempt to discuss this phenomenon must focus on the evolution of terrorism as well as on the aspects of the potential threat of arms technology.

4. Terrorism in Southeast Asia with Respect to Local Separatist Act in the Philippines (Case Study)

I will attempt to identify possible alliances between transnational terrorist groups of Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiah related to local separatist groups Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Abu Sayyap Group (ASG). This chapter will discuss the prominent elements of these different forms of collaboration between Al-Qaeda in South Asia and Al-Qaeda's collaboration with Jamaah Islamiah groups related to the act of local separatist groups and their linkage to international terrorist organization.

5. Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Southeast Asia with Respect to the Philippines and Indonesia and U.S. Countering - Terrorism Policy in Southeast Asia

The level of the threat posed by the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is difficult to predict accurately. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, effort against terrorism have increased, but the result has been far from successful. To curtail the spread of terrorism, the U.S. and Southeast Asia countries have created a partnership policy in combating terrorism. The focus of this chapter explores the U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Southeast Asia countries, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines. I also examine what the Philippine and Indonesian perspective in facing national and regional/transnational terrorists.

By respecting the interests of each country in combating terrorism, the main value of the multilateral agreement lies in setting international standards and elevating a general awareness of international problems.

6. Conclusion

This final chapter presents summarizes the conclusions related to the previous chapters, answers the key questions of the thesis, summarizes counter- terrorist policy and its implication, and make recommendations for Southeast Asia's future security.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM

A. HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW

Terrorism, as a cost effective tool of low-intensity conflict that instills psychological intimidation through the use of illegal physical force, has ancient roots. Examples are the attacks mounted by the Jewish religious extremists known as Zealot Sicarii against the Romans in occupied Judea as well as the martyrdom missions of the Hashasin (assassins) targeting the crusaders in the Middle East. The former were active for seventy years from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Their experience has proven that terrorism can be effective, even if the tools are rather primitive.¹²

In subsequent periods, several European maritime states between the sixteenth and late eighteen centuries employed pirates to terrorize the seas for the purpose of advancing foreign policy objectives. The period between the two World Wars also witnessed waves of attacks in Asia and the Middle East where nationalist groups fought for liberation from colonial rule.

It was not until the late 1960s that terrorism became a constant fixture of international life. Rapid developments in modern technology, improvements in communications facilities, and inexpensive and rapid travel contributed to the proliferation of indigenous and international terrorist groups and to the intensification of ideological and political violence.

More specifically according to Yonah Alexander, present day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of violence, in terms of both threats and responses, that makes it clear that we have entered an “age of terrorism” with serious implications for national, regional, and global security. Perhaps the most significant dangers that result from modern-day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.¹³

¹² Yonah Alexander, “Combating Terrorism,” *Strategy of Ten Countries*, 2002, p. 5.

¹³ Ibid.

The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the use of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires each state, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible responses and capabilities in order to minimize future threats.

Since most Southeast Asian states are developing, the domestic situation within those states enables terrorists to expand their power and network. Owing to the grievances of their citizens, it is plausible that many Southeast Asian countries are becoming a haven for a small number of terrorists, which have been penetrated by Al-Qaeda operatives for three primary reasons: the Afghan connection to middle Eastern extremists; the increasing grievance of Southeast Asian Muslims for socio-economic and political reasons; and Southeast Asian states have been considered “countries of convenience” by international terrorists.¹⁴

B. TERRORISM AND ACTIVITIES

With regard to predictions of future terrorism, the following analysis of recent trends will focus on three different aspects: The tactics and weapons used throughout the past decades, the focus of targeting innocent victims and the massive fatalities that ensue from the terrorist acts.

1. Trends in Tactics

The terrorist has become lethal in the past decade. Fortunately, the killings have thus far been conducted without the terrorists having to resort to unconventional weaponry. In this instance, convention bombs create very traumatic effects, they are fairly easy to produce, and inexpensive. The necessary technology and ingredients for each are readily available, and the purchase of ingredients does not arouse suspicion and is thus difficult to track. In the same way meager skill is required to manufacture a crude bomb, plant it, and be miles away when it explodes. Bombing, therefore, does not require the same organizational expertise, knowledge, back-up option, or logistical support required by more complicated or sophisticated operations as in assassination, kidnapping, hostage-taking or an attack against a defended target.¹⁵ Throughout the 1990’s, the favorite terrorist tactics, accounting for roughly sixty percent of incidents

¹⁴ Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, 2002, p. 431.

¹⁵ Hoffman, 1993, vol. 5, ch. 2, p. 13.

throughout the period were attacks, hijacking, hostage, kidnapping, and arson.¹⁶ Barricade and hostage situations, accounted for the remaining forty-percent of terrorist incidents. Time has shown that these percentages have remained relatively unchanged over three decades. This indicates that the majority of terrorist organizations have not been tactically innovative. Innovation has only occurred, if it all, in the methods to conceal and to detonate explosive devices, but not in actual tactics, and to date they have not included unconventional weapons.¹⁷

2. Focus of Aiming

The attention of the terrorist groups, in the past tended to be directed against objects rather than people. Since a terrorist operation is symbolic in character it is directed against a symbol of the adversary, such as embassies, government agencies, diplomat business, airlines, and the military.¹⁸ The military, more than any other organization and agency, represents a state's power, which it self is questioned and contested by the terrorist. Unfortunately any alliance between terrorism and its resident country is likely to disproportionately increase the overall threat to the national security of that country, whether it is truly to blame or not.

Presently, diplomatic personnel and an increasing number of civilian are the focus of terrorist attacks followed by business, airlines, and finally, civilian targets.¹⁹ Other incidents have included attacks on energy, maritime, transportation, communication, and various economic targets. This trend toward a more discriminate target has increased greatly in the last six years.

3. The Fatality Acts

Most terrorist incidents result in fatalities. Additionally, those operations that did succeed tended to kill many people.²⁰ The reasons for this trend include: the media helps to act as a multiplier, increases the resurgence of ethnic and religious terrorism, meaning

¹⁶ United States Department of State, Patterns Global Terrorism, 1991-1996.

¹⁷ Hoffman, 1993, vol. 5, ch. 2, p. 12.

¹⁸ Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 14.

¹⁹ The United States Department of State, Pattern Global Terrorism, 1991-1996.

²⁰ Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 14.

that terrorists become more adept at killing. Also, as societies have become more accustomed to violence and atrocity, terrorists must be increasingly violent to gain the desired attention and to create the desired effect.

The inclination toward more casualties and fatalities, which began in the 1980s, however, is rooted in more than one factor. Contemporary terrorist organizations are not only smarter than their predecessors; they also trend to be more ruthless and less idealistic. For more of them, it seems: “violence becomes an end in itself a cathartic release, a self- satisfying blow struck against the hated ‘system’- rather than being regarded as the deliberate means to a specific political good embraced by a previous generation.”²¹

In general, over the previous decades, the terrorist has become more lethal, yet has followed an established pattern of tactics and targeting with bombing remaining a favorite terrorist tactic with government, diplomatic and military installations and their personnel remaining their targets of choice.

C. TERRORISM: CASES AND AIMS

In order to develop further this discussion, the cases of influence and likely future targets of terrorist campaigns will be explored.

1. Cases of Influence

With the past as guide, future terrorist operations will be influenced by a great variety of different factors, which will influence each other in complex ways. The influence of factors is based on the assumption that the various terrorist organizations with their different motivations are pursuing various aims.

With respect to motivation, religious terrorist groups act in different ways from groups that are motivated by socio-revolutionary aims. While the latter are affected by political, moral, or practical constraints, and thus purposefully adjust the means to the political end, a religious terrorist assumes a “transcended” dimension. Religion becomes manipulated to provide a rationale for the use of violence, like the group of terrorist

²¹ Ibid., p. 16.

called al-Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden, using Islam to achieve the goal. There is no need to justify the elimination of the infidel, when violence becomes a sacramental act or divine duty.

If we look to the objective of the terrorist act, we have to distinguish between short-term, mid-term and long-term aims, and the respective means to reach them. Is terror and atrocity, for instance, an end in itself, or is the terrorist act intended to achieve a long-term goal? Is the attack part of an overall strategy or is it an isolated act? Does the terrorist act itself serve an operational goal or strategic aim, or is it meant to finance the organization?²²

Besides motivation and objective, technology constitutes another important factor. The dimensions herein are availability, obtainability, and suitability of the desired technology with regard to the planned operation. Terrorist organizations that are sponsored by foreign governments are likely to have access to the same spectrum of technology that is available to their respective governments. Terrorists sponsored by other non-state organizations or acting on their own behalf are likely to be better funded and equipped than groups that act on their own. For example, drug cartels normally have remarkable financial and organizational capacities at their disposal. The Russian Mafia is believed to have access to nearly every technology, including nuclear material that the Russian government has.

Another factor that cannot be neglected is the target itself. One must distinguish between the target of violence, and the target of influence. The “terrorist-victim-target-audience” relationship is highly complex. As Michel Stohl wrote:

An important key to the understanding of terrorism is to recognize that while each of the component parts of the process is important, the emotional impact of the terrorist act and the social effect are more important than the action itself. In other words, the targets of the terror are far more important for the process than are the victims of the immediate act.²³

²² Maria Jose Moyano, *Argentinos Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle 1996-1979*, Yale University, 1995.

²³ Michael Stohl, “Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism,” in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls*, 1990, p. 83.

All three dimensions such as the victim, the target and the audience are furthermore to be considered in the context of the terrorist act, its objectives, and its respective motivation.

2. Future Aim Points

Government and the military installations as well as diplomats are the most favored targets. This trend is likely to continue, since those targets embody powerful symbols of the system whose legitimacy the terrorists are questioning. In the case of diplomatic targets, the fact that two or more nations can be targeted at the same time (the host nation as well as the accredited nation) make this type of target most valuable.

The military, more than other organizations and agencies, represents the monopoly of a state's power, which itself is contested by the terrorist. Since the nation state can be targeted either directly, being both victim and target of the terrorist operation at the same time, or indirectly, through actions that inflict either fear or mistrust in their respective society, it in general will likely suffer more lethally as indiscriminate violence increases. Thus, the terrorist violence becomes the concern of whole societies and not merely of its sectors.

As the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, U.S. citizens remain favored targets of terrorists throughout the world. As Hoffman noted, "Since 1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose people and property are the most frequently attacked by terrorists."²⁴ This phenomenon is attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of United States being an overseas commercial, political and military power, as it is to the United States being the only superpower and the leader of the free world. While international terrorists may perceive a strike within the U.S. difficult, it is easy to attack a single American or an American interest overseas since these interests and citizens are so close, as seen in the Bali bombing where the prominent terrorist target was American.

D. TERRORISTS' MODUS OPERANDI

Groups of terrorists have used a wide range of tactics in order to achieve their political, social, and economic objectives. As discussed, these methods of operation included arson, bombings, kidnapping, hijacking, facility attacks, destruction of property,

²⁴ Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 24.

the slaughter of innocent people, and assassinations. The terrorist arsenal not only includes explosives and arms, such as guns, but also includes more sophisticated weapons, such as antitank rockets and ground-to-air missiles.

With the general pattern of criminal behavior, the modus operandi of terrorist groups will vary considerably depending on each group's motivation and capabilities. Groups that are small and unsophisticated can be expected to rely mostly on bombings. Those with state support and whose members have greater skill will attempt to execute more complex operations such as kidnappings, assassinations, facility attacks, and hijacking.

Having said this, what is of particular concern is the fact that "super weapons" are slowly emerging upon the terrorist scene. That is, if technology develops new capabilities for terrorist groups, their modus operandi may change. According to various intelligence reports, at least a dozen terrorist groups have shown an interest in acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. For instance, when the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo terrorist doomsday cult mounted the sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, which killed twelve people and injured more than five thousand, it was seeking more lethal weapons than sarin when its leaders were arrested.²⁵

Yet having attained considerable tactical success during the past four decades, terrorists sometimes find it politically expedient to restrain the level of political violence. It is important to understand that these self – imposed restraints will not persist indefinitely and that future incidents may continue to be costly in term of human lives and property. Certain conditions, such as religious extremism or perceptions that their "cause" is lost, could provide terrorists with an incentive to escalate their attack dramatically.

Indeed, future terrorist incidents could be much more costly in terms of human lives and property than in the past. The use of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear) used as instruments of terrorist could inflict large-scale damage on persons and property. For instance, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains low in comparison to biological and chemical terrorism, the consequence for mass

²⁵ Yonah Alexander, "Combating Terrorism," *Strategies of Ten Countries*, 2002, p. 6.

destruction is enormous. Thus, if a nuclear bomb is stolen, an explosion in a major city of one kiloton in magnitude would cause more than one-hundred thousands fatalities and damage totaling billions of dollars. The human, physical, and psychological consequences of such an incident would be far more catastrophic than those of the Three Mile Islands or Chernobyl accidents caused by operators who innocently overrode key safety systems of nuclear reactors.²⁶

E. FUTURE THREATS

Future threats include weapons of mass destruction that could be used by terrorists. Some of the threats analyzed here are new in the sense that they will improve tactical innovation. In a few cases, the innovation may be the change in terrorist behavior, or the emergence of hitherto non-existing or neglected terrorist types. The new threats may not totally replace the traditional threats.

1. Weapon of Mass Destruction

During the Japanese rush hour, on March 20, 1995, the members of the Aum Shinri Kyo sect put deadly gas sarin in the commuter train bound for Kasumigaseki. The gas spread through the car and station at which the train stopped, killing twelve people and over five thousand were injured and some permanently scared.²⁷

Since Tokyo was previously known as the world's safest metropolis, the city was under siege with fear. As Kaplan writes,

The Tokyo attack marked a significant turning point in terrorist operation, and its aftermath sent tremors around the globe. Mass transit systems throughout the world tightened security and in New York an airline jet spent ten hours on the runway at John F. Kennedy airport while the FBI checked out the threats that poison gas was aboard the flight.²⁸

The terrorist threat posed by WMD is a particularly difficult issue for the government because of the complexity of preparing for a huge variety of potential attacks and the many toxic substances that might be used. Profound resources would be needed to prepare or solve such a problem. Given the number of government entities and

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ron Puver, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety?" *Conflict Studies*, no. 295, London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997.

²⁸ David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, "The Cult at the End of the World," 1996, p. 264.

jurisdictions that would be involved, many inherent difficulties exist in creating a coordinated program. Therefore, the selective “risk management” approach in which limited resources are invested specifically where the risk is greatest is probably needed. There is also a need to control the official commentary concerning the threats of weapons of mass destruction in order to avoid creating needless anxiety.

2. Cyber Terrorist

Scientists and experts are cooperating with the armed forces throughout the world to identify the vulnerabilities of a new battlefield using information warfare. The basic assumption is that the one who controls this new battlefield retains the initiative on the other battlefield as well. Modern societies of today are, to a great extent, dependent on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information. The amount of data used in this process increases daily. Their importance in the day-to-day life of these societies makes it a vital area in terms of security concerns. Defense, banking, power supply, law enforcement agencies, intelligence, trade, and transportations systems area all on line. This in turn exposes large amounts of vital, and often enough confidential data to mischief or sabotage by any able computer hacker.

Michael Jakub, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of State, stressed this future threat. Inevitable disruption of information systems through viruses or electronic sabotage, the ability of groups-especially Mafia-type and terrorist groups to obtain funds through electronic penetration and manipulation of financial systems, as well as penetration of info-systems in an attempt to obtain information on people and possible targets, opens up the dimension of information warfare to terrorists as well.²⁹ However, criminal terrorists, organized crime, spies, and foreign governments are more likely to wage cyber-war against state or societies. Regarding cyber-war, vandalism is more likely than destruction. Nevertheless, the harm that can be achieved by means of information terrorism could be as destructive to the fabric of a society as the use of other, more lethal weapons.³⁰

²⁹ Congressional Research Service, 1995, p. 5.

³⁰ Walter Laquer, “Post Modern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 5, p. 35, 1996.

3. Religious Terrorist

While “religion” is generally associated with “goodness,” religion and terrorism share a long history. Historical examples of terrorism motivated by religious imperative are the “Zealots”, a millenarian Jewish sect that fought the Roman occupation of what is now the state of Israel between 66-73AD, or the “Thugs”, an Indian association of professional robbers and murderers who, being active from the seventh until the mid-19th century, systematically strangled wayward travelers as sacrificial offerings to Kali, the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction.³¹

In recent decades, however, terrorism has been predominantly politically or ideologically motivated and thus overshadowed the relationship of terrorism and religion. While in 1968 none of the identifiable, active terrorist groups could be classified as religious; in 1993 at least 20 percent of the approximately 50 active terrorist groups could be described as having a religious motivation.³²

Although religious terrorism is predominantly connected with Islamic fundamentalism, it has to be recognized that a great variety of groups carry a religious element in their motivation, which is not necessarily of Islamic origin. More recently, they are supplemented by new generation of millennialist groups, cults and sects, as seen in the September 11th and Bali bombing.

F. COMPREHENSIVENESS

In looking at the identifiable patterns in the choice of tactics and targets, bombs and guns were the favorite weapons of traditional terrorist groups, with an emphasis on bombing. The reason being that bombing requires limited efforts and resources and provides a lethal output. More recently, bombing seems to be used as a form of discriminate violence, becoming increasingly fatal and more disruptive. It is a distant type of terrorism, with no need for terrorists to engage in any kind of personal interaction with their victims. This may be seen as a kind of mirror image of our societies, which are daily becoming more anonymous.

³¹ Hoffman, 1993, p. 1.

³² Ibid, p. 2.

Even though the total number of incidents as international terrorism has declined, the number of casualties has risen. Terrorists have become more adapted to violence. When youths have grown up with violence as a normal and natural part of their lives, and are well trained, as in streets gang, in the science of killing, they pass a higher threshold for the number of casualties or the level of violence they are willing to inflict upon their targets.

With respect to targeting, diplomatic, business area, entertainment places, government, and military targets are current favorite yet indiscriminate targeting is becoming more common. Although the discrete targets are likely to remain the same, contemporary terrorism affects a broader dimension of the population than terrorism did in the past.

The elements that have influenced terrorism are most complex in their structure and influence each other in multiple dimensions. Thus, an exact prediction of future terrorist activities and the development of a successful preemptive strategy remains a most challenging task.

Since politically motivated terrorism is in decline, and religious motivated terrorism, including the varieties of groups that respond to a religious imperative in their actions is on the rise, the self-imposed constraints of the past are harder to recognize. Thus, terrorism in the future is likely to be very different from the terrorism in the past. This effect is reinforced by the increasing number of cults, sects and groups that view the millennium in apocalyptic terms and feel themselves committed to hasten Armageddon. In this context, the September 11th attacks of WTC (World Trade Center) have clearly changed the face of terrorism. The use of WMD by non-state groups or organizations can no longer be ruled out. Terrorists, fanatical single-issue groups and even individuals can muster the expertise and resources that were once limited to only world and regional powers.

The relatively recent appearance of the new type of terrorist such as the “Unabomber”, who follows no recognizable organizational pattern, makes targeting and preemptive measures for law enforcement agencies even more difficult.

In addition, the old-fashioned type of terrorist has adapted, grown, and learned. Technology has proven to be a double-edged sword. New technologies that are coming on-line not only benefit government and business organizations, but terrorists and criminals as well. Moreover, the information system used by advanced societies offer a new battlefield with new vulnerabilities to be exploited by terrorists. Consequently, present day societies must face the traditional terrorist together with the new breed described above, as they must face old, traditional technologies together with the whole spectrum of WMD. Thus, one could argue that terrorism has not changed; it has merely diversified.

Future terrorism will increase for several reasons. First, terrorism has proved to be very successful in attracting publicity, disrupting the activities of governments and businesses, and causing significant amounts of death and destruction. Second, arms, explosives, financing, and secret communications are readily available. Third, an international support network of groups and states exist that greatly facilitates terrorist activities.

Advances in science and technology are slowly turning all modern societies into potential victims of terrorism. As such, there is no immunity for noncombatants or neutral nations who may or may not have any direct connection to those who choose terrorism to further their political or ideological agenda.

III. TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO JEMAAH ISLAMIAH AND AL-QAEDA IN INDONESIA (CASE STUDY)

A. INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia is experiencing tremendous changes both politically and economically. The market-oriented economies of Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have been showing robust growth since the 1960s. The transitional economies of Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are exhibiting signs of economic awakening and revival after years of internal political and social turmoil. Despite these encouraging signs, the region still has a long road ahead in its efforts to achieve developed nations status.³³ This chapter focuses on development initiatives that have been incorporated in wider peace and conflict resolution efforts in an attempt to mitigate the local perception of past wrongdoings in communities that support terrorist groups.

The root causes of terrorism, both domestic and international, are varied and complex. Some factors are essentially ideological and include religious and ethno-nationalistic extremism. In addition, another set of factors arise from serious socio-economic deficits, such as poverty and unemployment resulting from a combination of poor governance and the inability to cope with globalization processes.³⁴ Southeast Asia countries have enacted social and economic development policies to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdiction. The efforts of these countries demonstrate not only the potential benefits but also the shortcomings of using social and economic development as a counter-terrorism tool. This incorporates an evaluation of the types of projects chosen and the correct implementation of the appropriate strategy. However, further attention will also be needed to alleviate the social economic disadvantages, which have fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions such as the Philippines and Indonesia.

³³ Liam Chong Yah, Singapore, Southeast Asia the Long Road Ahead, Nanyang Technology University, 2003, p. 1.

³⁴ Rommel C. Bonlai, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 2003, p. 13.

There has been significant analysis in academic and policy making communities as to exactly what constitutes “development” as well as “terrorism.”³⁵ This analysis, therefore, begins with a short explanation of the interaction between the two. For the purposes of the analysis, “development” is defined as a process whereby the real per capita income of the country increases over a period of time while simultaneously poverty is reduced and inequality in society is generally reduced or at least not increased.³⁶ “Terrorism” is defined as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Though some might surmise that poverty causes violence, the link between terrorism and development, as defined above, is by no means self-evident. In fact, two of the countries included in this analysis (Indonesia and the Philippines) are generally considered developing countries with large numbers of marginalized people, in Mindanao, Aceh, West Papua, etc. and yet are still subject to terrorist attacks. Part of this discrepancy is definitional. While “development” refers to the economic, social and political conditions of a particular state’s population in its entirety, the organizations considered in this analysis recruit and operate only from marginalization within their countries of origin.³⁷

Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest nation and biggest Muslim community, major oil and gas exporter, fulcrum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the region’s most important state, remains in the throes of social, political, and economic instability. These three forces from various circles of political instability render it difficult to emerge from the economic malaise that reinforces political and social tensions.³⁸ It must be recognized that poverty and extreme socio-economic marginalization are root causes of terrorism. These may be the result of either deficient domestic policies or powerful globalization processes. Hence, developed countries should increase trade, investment and aid linkages with developing countries to enhance

³⁵ For a brief discussion of the evaluation of these two terms, see Hoffman, 1998, pp. 13-44.

³⁶ Martinussen, 1997, p. 37.

³⁷ Martinussen, 1997.

³⁸ J. Rober Kerey, Report an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, p. 3.

their capacities for good governance, enabling the latter to eradicate corruption as well as to ameliorate mass resentment by generating jobs and raising living standards across the board.³⁹

Conflict can be interpreted as a form of bargaining, with its own discourse of accusation and wrongdoings, which is often distinct from the cause or reality of the original conflict.⁴⁰ This general pattern is certainly true of the terrorist organizations and their support communities. For example in Mindanao, advocates of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) claim that the Christian-dominated central government of the Philippines has not only ignored the needs of the local Moro population, but also violently repressed Muslim dissent.⁴¹

This chapter also focuses on the point at which government attempts to enact economic and social policies to address the perception of past wrongdoing in communities that support terrorist organizations. Ruling administrations do this not necessarily out of any moral imperative, but in the interest of preventing resurgence in terrorist activities.

B. INDONESIA IS NOT A RELIGION COUNTRY

Indonesia is a unique country. Before the introduction of the Buddhist religion, the Indonesian population adhered to the teaching of Animism and Dynamism. When Buddha spread to Indonesia, most Indonesian people adopted this religion. Then, when Hinduism came into Indonesia, most of the Indonesian population ascribed to this religion. In addition, when Islam came into Indonesia, most of the Indonesian population embraced it as their religion. Christianity arrived with the arrival of the Portuguese, English and Dutch.

Those facts show that Indonesian people were quite receptive to new religions. At the inception of these religions in Indonesia, the role of the kings who governed at that time was very dominant. In fact, the kings determined the success of the religion. The king himself would accept the new religion and then invited his people to follow.

³⁹ Rommel C. Bonlai, 2003, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Pillar, 1983, pp. 1-16.

⁴¹ Marks, 1996, p. 83.

In such a way, the national role was pivotal in allowing the religion to spread and allow all of its adherents to practice their religious devotion. However, Indonesia has never claimed itself as a religion nation, nor a nation of any one religion. The kings also never proclaimed his religion as correct, although his people who were very devoted performed the same religious service. Although there is a belief that Indonesia is a religious nation, it has shown little loyalty toward any one religion. The movement in the name of Islam although currently considered fundamental, contains radicals (who are) and who practice fanatic law like the group named, Jemaah Islamiyah. Unfortunately, the same Arabic term is used in Indonesia and is synonymous with all terrorist groups.

Since the Asian economic crisis of 1997 to 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the Soeharto regime, the rise of an ethnic and religious conflict and the growth of the separatist movement and terrorism have signaled a loss of central authority over many provinces within Indonesia. However, the authoritarian bureaucratic-military vision of the state and society dominating the Soeharto era has been replaced by a greater emphasis on civil society and political parties as the primary focus of order and stability, exemplified by parliament more powerfully and legitimately than at any time since 1950.⁴² Furthermore, Indonesia weathered the storm over the impeachment of President Wahid and the ascendance of Megawati Soekarno Putri – the first female President. This is especially significant as Megawati supports a hard line toward separatism. It is this response to separatism that directly affects Indonesia's future.

Political analysis and intelligence officials believe that Indonesia may become one of the next key bases for Al-Qaeda.⁴³ Indonesia is viewed as a prime operating region because of its numerous islands and porous borders. Economic collapse, governmental corruption, growing sectarian violence, and the demands of the outlying islands for independence or greater autonomy are generating concerns that the Indonesian political system may not be able to withstand.⁴⁴

⁴² Angel Rabasa, 2001, p. 9.

⁴³ Paul J. Smith, 2002, p. 48.

⁴⁴ Angel Rabasa, 2001, p. 27.

The two largest separatist states are West Papua and Aceh. Both share common grievances with the central government-economic exploitation, domination of provincial administration by outsiders (typically Javanese) with disregard for local culture (especially in Papua), and anger at military excesses and human rights abuses. The separatist movement in Papua is largely Christian, making ties to al-Qaeda theoretically impossible. This has resulted in widespread terror used by both the state and the Acehnese and Papuan fighters to subjugate the local population.

More disturbing has been the large-scale ethnic and religious violence in the eastern islands of Indonesia (the Moluccas or “Maluku”). From the outbreak of the violence in Ambon during 1999 until the middle of 2000, more than 9,000 people were killed throughout the Moluccas and more than 400,000 became refugees.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the radical Muslim organizations in Java, such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), have used terror to mobilize supporters and to attack the government for insufficient solicitude for Islamic interest.

In those matters, Indonesia is not alone in his battle against internal insurgence and terrorist. Southeast Asian terrorist organizations with cells linking to Al-Qaeda were publicly uncovered in late 2001.

C. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND GOVERNANCE

Instability still lingers in Indonesia including separatist movements, religious and ethnic conflict. The political and social uncertainties of Indonesia, a great power in the region, still pose a threat of disturbing the stability of its regions. In referring back to economic recovery, the macro economy has not been strong enough to gain the people’s confidence and mistrust of their government is thus growing. Under such circumstances, new administrations have emerged in Indonesia, and people’s expectations for effective economic management by these new administrations are mounting. The new government has been facing major tasks such as promoting economic reform and settling social unrest.

As a result of the Asia financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia which had enjoyed favorable economic development, suffered setbacks that exposed the structural distortions

⁴⁵ Kirsan E. Schulze, Spring 2002, p. 27.

hidden beneath economic growth. With the financial assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asia Development Bank, Indonesia showed signs of recovery in 1999. However, progress continues to be slow. The structural reforms are insufficient to sustain the recovery, so political and social uncertainties still linger. The separatist movements, especially in Aceh and West Papua, are major factors that threaten the democratic process and stability in Indonesia. The government's efforts to downplay the possibility that Indonesia harbored international terrorists were blown apart by the bombing in Bali on October 2002. This evidence can be distinguished from other violence in the archipelago by their planning, intended targets, and impact on the Indonesian government and international relations; it was also a blow to Indonesia's fragile economy, which is continuing to make a very slow recovery from the crisis of 1997 to 1998. Prior to the Bali bombing, the government hoped for growth at about 3.5 percent for 2002, rising to 5 percent in 2003. However, these figures had to be revised downward. The government plans to spend USD \$630 million on an emergency stimulus plan during 2003 to offset some of the damage.⁴⁶ Oil prices and low interest rates have helped the Indonesian economy, but corruption, political uncertainty, lack of confidence in the legal system, labor unrest, and the failure to sell nationalized banks have all been negative factors.

Fortunately, Indonesia faces no conventional external threats. However, in terms of forces that impact its internal balances, there are multiple threats. One obvious force is international Islamist radicals such as al-Qaeda, who threaten Indonesia by supplying inspiration and training to disillusioned young Indonesians. Other Indonesians perceive the West as a threat. In the aftermath of the Bali bombing, conspiracy theories abounded. According to one widely circulated story, the bombings were an elaborate plot hatched by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to bring Indonesia firmly into the anti-terrorist coalition and to strengthen the internal role of the military and police.⁴⁷ The quick passage of anti-terrorist legislation, which could be abused by the security forces and efforts by the military to strengthen its local role, gave further weight to this theory.

⁴⁶ Charles E. Morisson, "Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003," p. 74.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Indonesian social reformers fear that renewed external support for Indonesian police and the military from Western countries, including the United States and Australia, threaten democratic reform efforts.

As a sovereign state, Indonesians are concerned about the impact of the official's past wrongdoing. With the outbreak of communal and separatist violence, security problems in many remote areas and the lack of trained police, the goal of achieving reform of the territorial structure will not be achieved easily. In fact, a new regional command has been created in Maluku and Aceh, which seems reasonable in order to bring the armed forces closer to the people. Reformers are afraid that change in the territorial command system may either be deferred indefinitely or handled by the armed forces themselves rather than as part of a more comprehensive security and defense review by the civilian government.

The major problems that Indonesia faced were the unrest and the separatism in the country, combined with international terrorism. This would seem to call for a stronger role than before for the armed forces, intelligence services, and the police.⁴⁸ However, a wide spectrum of Indonesia, including Muslims, democratic and human rights activists, and business people, continue to distrust the security and law enforcement because of their past record. They are much more inclined than foreign interests to see the military and police as a threat to their civil liberties rather than as a solution to law and order problems. As the result, they remain skeptical of sudden and easy reforms.

Despite Indonesia's numerous problems, the Indonesian defense's budget is estimated to be US \$1 billion, only about 1 percent of the gross domestic product. As much as three quarters of this amount goes into personnel cost. It is estimated that the government provides only 25 percent to 30 percent of the budget of the Indonesian National Military (TNI-Tentara National Indonesia). To minimize the lack of funding and to support military operations, the military continues to find other sources of revenue, particularly in business. Raising funds becomes the central focus of the military to the detriment of the professional military activities. The issue of raising funds also explains

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 76.

the low value of the military to the territorial command system. This is another long-term problem plaguing Indonesian's security system, and one in which very little practical progress has been made thus far in the post-Suharto reform era.

The main contribution that Indonesia can make to regional and global security comes from strengthening Indonesia as a well-governed state. An Indonesia that is weak or riddled with corruption obviously becomes a haven for pirates, human and drug traffickers, and terrorists. One positive development flowing from the Bali bombing has been much more active and serious cooperation between Indonesian intelligence and police services with their international counterparts, including Australia and the United States as well as Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbors.⁴⁹

D. BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST

One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far suspected of links to al-Qaeda. It is important to understand how this network emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two decades that led some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to Afghanistan.

The network has its hub in a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok) near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the Village where the school is located. The "Ngruki network" began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential political enemies of then President Soeharto from the Muslim right. It drew additional members in the early 1980s, many of whom had served time in prison for anti-government activities. An inner core network, led by the two founders of Pondok Ngruki Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir—and radicalized by repression at home, fled to Malaysia in 1985. Some associated with the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Suharto's resignation in 1998; others stayed in Malaysia but continued to be in close contact with those who went back.⁵⁰ Most members of the network share common characteristics: loyalty to Pondok Ngruki or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state under syariah law by first establishing an Islamic community or Jemaah Islamiah, and shared experience of

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 77.

⁵⁰ Indonesia Briefing, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia, 2002, p. 1.

political detention in the 1980s. Many are on the executive committee of an organization formed in Yoyakarta in 2000 called the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI- Indonesia Mujahidin Council).⁵¹

The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider than just the handful of people who have been accused of ties to al-Qaeda, but includes individuals with well-established political legitimacy for having defied the Suharto government and who have gone to prison as a result. Many Indonesians have expressed concern that pressure from the U.S. and the Southeast Asian government on Indonesian authorities to carry out preventive arrests of suspect without hard evidence could be seriously counterproductive. It could easily turn the targets of that pressure into heroes within the Muslim community, as happened with Abu Bakar Ba'syir, to the point that they become the beneficiaries of substantial political and financial support. Combining a highly politicized national intelligence agency with law enforcement institutions and courts that are both weak and corrupt could lead to a recurrence of the arbitrary arrest and detentions that characterized the Soharto years.

Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed. Proponents of radical Islam remain a small minority, and most of those are devout practitioners who would never dream of using violence. However, even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of damage. The challenge, both for the Indonesian government and international community, is to be alert to the possibility of individuals creating common causes with international criminals, who take steps that will undermine Indonesia's fragile democratic institutions.

E. THE EMERGING OF THE JEMAAH ISLAMIAH

Historically, the term of Jamaah Islamiah came from a little known organization called *Komando Jihad*. In the Islamic community it means "the group of people who desire to die as martyrs (mati syahid)" and who are committed to following the ideals of Darul Islam to establish the "Islamic state of Indonesia under syariah law."

With respect to the past decades of Darul Islam rebellions, in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Java, these were only three of numerous regional political

⁵¹ Ibid.

movements that occurred in the aftermath of Indonesian's successful guerrilla war against the Dutch. In each case, they were led by charismatic militia commanders from "modernist" Muslim backgrounds that controlled significant territory during the revolution and were reluctant to surrender the authority to the new central government. In each case, whatever the original cause of the rebellion, they each ended in demanding the establishment of Islamic state.

Karto Suwiryo, who was the leader of Darul Islam in West Java, announced the establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia. At that point, he regarded the Dutch government, not the newly declared Indonesian Republic, as the enemy and had not yet declared a separate state. However, as he consolidated his authority in West Java and began to set up political and administrative structures, clashes with the Republican Army were inevitable. On 7 August 1949, Karto Suwiryo officially proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia-NII) and proceeded to fight the Indonesian republic for the next thirteen years. These rebellions were called *Darul Islam*, "abode of Islam," hence the name of the movement. Karto Suwiryo was finally arrested in 1962.⁵²

A little over a decade later after the Darul Islam groups were crushed by the Republican Army, the Darul Islam movement resurfaced in the 1970s. President Soeharto did not become president in name until 1968, but Sukarno (the first President of Indonesia) effectively transferred power to him in 1966. As elections were approaching in 1977, the one permitted Muslim party (Partai Persatuan Islam-PPP) was gathering strength as the loyal opposition. A vote for the PPP was the only way ordinary Indonesians in tightly controlled states could express dissatisfaction with the government. To prevent the possibility of a large PPP vote, General Ali Murtopo (Minister of Information in Suharto's cabinet) who was in charge of covert operations for Soeharto, reactivated Darul Islam, although some people close to the former Darul Islam leaders say that he merely moved to manipulate a movement that had already shown signs of revival.⁵³

⁵² Indonesia Briefing, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia, 2002, p. 3.

⁵³ Ibid.

Through the Indonesian Intelligence Agency-“BAKIN,” former Darul Islam fighters, primarily but not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian Army and government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades. The argument provided by BAKIN was that with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration across Indonesia and that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through coercion or money or some combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to take the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organization called Komando Jihad. In reality, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo’s creation.

From the beginning, Komando Jihad and what government prosecutors called Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic Community) intersected, although it was never clear whether the government was attributing more structure to the latter than was the case. Komando Jihad was the label applied by the government and Indonesian media to the former Darul Islam fighters, who never used it themselves. The term “Jemaah Islamiah” appears in court documents from the 1980s referring to the new organization that Darul Islam thought they were setting up. However, while the Darul Islam members certainly talked in terms of establishing Islamic communities in a generic sense, government prosecutors offered little hard evidence that Jemaah Islamiah was in fact an organization with an identifiable leadership.

It was the premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and his followers, that setting up Jemaah Islamiah was a necessary precursor to the establishing an Islamic state.

F. ESTABLISHING THE JEMAAH ISLAMIAH (JI) NETWORK

Since 1993, Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar instructed his deputies, Hambali and Abu Jibril, to establish a network of militant cells throughout Southeast Asia. They launched an active recruiting campaign in Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaysia, recruitment focused on two key groups: Indonesian migrants and University Technology Malaysia lecturers and students. In Singapore, recruitment focused on older, more established middle-class individuals: these were well-educated people with good jobs, products of state schools, not the stereotypical Islamic radical.

The membership of Jemaah Islamiah is highly selective and comprised three phases over many years. “We want people who will be loyal to the aims of the group; we are not a mass organization,” said one senior Jemaah Islamiah official.⁵⁴ The first phase involved the screening of individuals, including their family backgrounds and knowledge of Islam. The second, Hambali enrolled the students at Pesantren (Islamic Board School) to study Islam. Many young radicals were sent to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The third phase, a training/recruitment regimen, was physical and military by nature. Some of them were sent to Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and to MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) bases in Mindanao. There, they learned bomb-making, weapons training, surveillance, sabotage, communications and cell formation.

At the heart of their recruitment was the Al Tarbiyah Luminial Hakiem Islamic boarding School outside the southern Malaysian city of Johor Baru that was purchased in the mid-1990. The school master, Ali Guhfron, later became the head of the Jamaah Islamiah’s (JI) Malaysian cell, and in 2002, the head of operations for JI. Students of this school included another Indonesian, Abdul Aziz, Imam Samudra, who went on to train in Afghanistan, and was the mastermind behind the Bali bombing.

G. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF JAMAAH ISLAMIAH (JI)

From 1994 to 1995, the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) was formally established, and in 1996, Abdullah Sungkar and some of the Afghan veteran consolidated the structure of Jemaah Islamiah, and the apex of the JI structure sits the *amir*, its position held by Abdullah Sungkar. Beneath the *amir* are four councils, a governing council (*majelis qiyadah*), a religious council (*majelis syuro*), a *fatwa* council, and disciplinary council (*majelis hisbah*), all appointed by the *amir* and subject to his control. The governing council is headed by a central command (*qiyadah markaziyah*) that in turn exerts authority over the leader of the four *mantiqis* and the heads of *wakalabs*.⁵⁵

The central command organizes division into four Brigades (*mantiqi*). Mantiqi I covered the area of operation in Singapore and Malaysia and was seen as providing the economic wherewithal for JI operations; Hambali was its head until early 2002 and then

⁵⁴ Darwin Pereira, “Potent Force with a Network in the Region,” *Strait Times*, January 20, 2002.

⁵⁵ Jamaah Islamiah in Southeast Asia: Damage but Still Dangerous, ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003, p. 11.

he was replaced by Mukhlas. Mantiqi II led by Abu Fatih covered operations most of Indonesia and was considered the target of jihad efforts. Mantiqi III led by Mustopa covered area of operation Mindanou, Sabah, and Sulawesi and was responsible for training. Mantiqi IV, led by Abdul Rochim, covered an area of operation, including Papua and Australia, was responsible for fund raising. According to one of the Singapore JI detainees, Hambali is the head over all of the *mantiqis*.

The *mantiqis* and their sub-divisions have usually been described as a territorially based administrative structure. Thus, the *mantiqis* were equivalent to regions, *wakalah* to district and so on, down to the *fiah* or cells.

The ICG considered that the JI probably used the military structure, befitting a guerrilla army, with brigades (*mantiqi*); battalion (*wakalah*); companies (*khatibah*); platoon (*qirdas*); and squad (*fiah*). The size of the central command is not known, but it includes the Zulkarnaen and Afghanistan veteran Mustaqim and included Mukhlash, Mustopa and Abu Rusdan before their arrests.

Under Mantiqi I, there were active *wakalah* in Singapore, johor, selangor/Kuala Lumpur, and Negri sembilan by 1996. In Indonesia, there were *wakalahs* in Jakarta, Medan, Pekanbaru, Lampung, Solo, Surabaya, Menado, Makasar, Poso, Palu, East Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara Barat. Its subdivision had its own name, for example, a member of *Wakalah Umar Al Chatab* in Singapore. It supervised two *qirdas*, jibril and Mika'il. Under *Qirdas Mika'il* were three cells, named Hud, Ismail, and Daud.

According to the description of the administrative structure of JI, anyone can be a member of JI who is Muslim, subscribes to *salafy* principles, practices a pure form of Islam devoid of corruption or innovation (*bid'ah*), and takes an oath administered by the amir or someone he so designates.⁵⁶ The JI goes far beyond its formal members. JI can work with any other JI-lamic community-as long as it shares the same principles and goals. The groundwork was thus laid for establishing working relations with al-Qaeda on the one hand and the MILF and Abu Sayyaf on the other, as well as for providing training to like minded organizations in other parts of Indonesia.

⁵⁶ In Interrogation Deposition of Jafaar bin Mistooki, 13 December 2002.

JI Islamiah works closely with different factions of Darul Islam, whose leaders have a collegial relationship with JI counterparts and send their recruits to be trained by JI instructors though they operate outside JI control. JI affiliated organizations have been active but decision making for jihad operations often takes place outside the JI command.

H. JEMAAH ISLAMIAH CONNECTIONS TO AL-QAEDA

As is now known, Al-Qaeda's political objective is to set up Islamic states committed to the unequivocal observance of shariah law in Muslim lands from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. It intends to do so by first deposing moderate Muslim governments, and this in turn requires eliminating the American support that helps sustain such regime. It is against this wider political background that we must examine more carefully the so-called "new terrorism" and discern what is indeed "new" and what is not. In this respect, it must be noted that the military strategic terms, Al-Qaeda is waging a guerilla war against the West and, and in particular, the United States. This guerrilla war has transnational character and is not confined to any particular state because the constituency that Osama bin Laden seeks to win the support of is not a specific Muslim population but rather the 1.2 billion-strong Muslim *ummah* or nation, which transcends states and ethnic boundaries. However, it must be emphasized that while this transnational guerilla war may be quite unlike a conventional, geographically delimited guerilla war conflict as theorized by Mao and Giap, it nevertheless remains in essence a guerilla war: Like Vo nguyen Giap before him, Osama bin Laden knows that he cannot engage American forces directly as he does not have the military strength to do so. Hence like Giap, he intends to defeat America by targeting not its military might but rather what he perceives to be its critical vulnerability or soft underbelly such as the American public.⁵⁷ In order to gain support from the Muslim world, al-Qaeda expanded connections to relate operatives to influence the most populous Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, which have similar objectives, namely, to create a Muslim state under *shariah* law. In this case, he connected and synchronized the operation to the fundamental Muslim group that was Jemaah Islamiah. While many Indonesians still question whether JI exists as a formal organization, most appear to have accepted that the

⁵⁷ "ASEAN Plan to Fight Terror," The Strait Times (Singapore), May 18, 2002, p. A 14.

men on trial for the Bali bombings were likely responsible for the crime and that Indonesia does indeed have some home-grown terrorists. What is much more difficult for many to accept is that those terrorists have links to al-Qaeda.

The arrest of Hambali the leader of Jemaah Islamiah could change this, but only if U.S. authorities quickly transfer him to Indonesian custody or at least give credible Indonesian authorities access to him.

It is clear that the Indonesian's fundamental connection with Osama bin Laden was established in the mid-1980s through Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and the Afghanistan training. Hambali provided the most important ongoing contact with the al-Qaeda leadership but he was not the only person with direct connections. Zulkarnaen, Syawal Yasin, and Fatur Rahman al Ghozali have similar ties. The JI cells were fairly independent of each other and clearly had specific functions. Each took advantage of certain socioeconomic, socio-politic, geographical, and demographic aspects of their host state to develop and plan operations. Although some funding was raised locally, much came from abroad. According to the Malaysian and Singapore intelligence, the JI has received some Rp 1.35 billion from Al-Qaeda since 1996. That year the JI received Rp250 million, and Rp400 million in 1997 and Rp 700 million in 2000.⁵⁸

The way in which al-Qaeda systematically began to establish operations in Southeast Asia, beginning in the Philippines in 1991 through Osama bin Laden's brother-in law, Mohammed Khalifa, has been well-documented.⁵⁹ By 1994, a Malaysian named Wali Khan Amin Shah was a key member of the cell established in Manila by Khalifa and Ramzi Youssef, the men responsible for the December 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Shah and Hambali were partners in a Malaysian business, Konsojaya, established in June 1994 that provided funding for some al-Qaeda

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Rodolfo Bauzon Mendoza, Jr., Philippines Jihad, Inc., Unpublished Manuscript (by a senior superintendent of Philippines National Police), 11 September 2002, and Yosri Fauda and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of Terror* (New York, 2003).

operations.⁶⁰ JI also consulted with al-Qaeda about a proposed plan to blow up U.S. installations and other foreign targets in Singapore in 2000, a plan that was discovered through videos and other documents found in Afghanistan after the Taliban fled.

Despite these clear ties, JI's relationship with Osama bin Laden's organization may be less one of subservience, as is sometimes portrayed, than of mutual advantage and reciprocal assistance, combine with the respect successful student have for their former teachers. One source familiar with JI described its relationship to al-Qaeda as similar to that of an NGO with funding agency. The NGO exists as a completely independent organization, but submits proposal to the donor and obtains a grant when the proposal is accepted. The donor only funds projects that are in line with its own programs. In this case, al-Qaeda may help fund specific JI programs but it neither directs nor controls them.⁶¹

I. AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE

Following the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia and the United states became convinced that a terror network link to al-Qaeda was operating in this region. In December 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of working with al-Qaeda. Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the Singapore connection. Thirteen of the Singapore detainees were said to be members of a cell of an organization that authorities identified as Jamaah Islamiah. Eight of the thirteen reportedly had training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They were believed to be planning to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying U.S. military personnel, as well as a U.S. naval vessel in Singapore.⁶² Singapore authorities said at the time that the arrested men reported to an Indonesian base in Malaysia known as "Hambali."

With the naming of Hambali, and with related arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiah members in Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals attention shifted to an Indonesia preacher Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In a speech in Singapore in May 2002, senior

⁶⁰ Dan Murphy, "Filipino Police Find 1995 Leads to Sept 11 Plot", *Christian Science Monitor*, February 14, 2002.

⁶¹ Jemaah Islamiah in Southeast Asia, Damaged but Still Dangerous, *ICG Asia Report*, no. 63, August 26, 2003.

⁶² Singapore Government Press Release, "Address by Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew" at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference, May 2002, p. 3.

Minister Lee Kwan Yew stated that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the leader of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council in Indonesia, and also was the overall leader of the Jamaah Islamiyah organization, which covered both Malaysia and Singapore. He was also found to be a member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for fourteen years to avoid detention by the Soeharto government and returned in 1999 after Soeharto fell from power.⁶³

Ba'asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, tried unsuccessfully to sue the Singapore government for defamation after similar statements from Minister Lee in February 2002. He is teaching openly at his school and has gained many admirers both for defying attempts to connect him to al-Qaeda and questioning U.S. motives in the war against terrorism. For the last two decades, he has been associated with small groups called Jemaah Islamiah whose teachings had both religious and political content.⁶⁴

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia, ICG Indonesia Briefing, August 2002.

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IV. TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO LOCAL SEPARATIST GROUPS ACT IN THE PHILIPPINES (CASE STUDY)

A. INTRODUCTION

Every year on the 12th of June, the Philippines always celebrate Independence Day from Spanish colonialism. It was more than a century ago when the country declared itself a nation-state and an independent republic after 337 years under Spanish colonial rule. Although it was the first country in Asia that gained its independence through a bloody revolution, the Philippines immediately had to accept American hegemony for another 46 years and Japanese rule for a brief three years. The birth of the Philippine nation-state in 1898 and the granting of political independence by the Americans in 1946 are historical milestones in the country's history that reflect the Filipinos resolve to self-govern and determine their future as a country without foreign colonizers.

The Philippines may begin to lose some of its characteristic of a vibrant democracy if the terrorist situation is allowed to worsen. Internal divisiveness and conflicts among classes, ideologies, and ethnicities, could undermine the national solidarity that the Philippines have struggled to create over the past 30 years.

Philippine history has been characterized by the dualisms of colonialism, revolution, counter-revolution, dictatorship and democracy. The difficult but exciting process of making and unmaking of a liberal democratic nation-state remains a continuing one. The country is shaped by its past, in defining its vision, national goals and objectives, policies, institution structure and processes. Achieving national unity in diversity continues to be a daunting task in the post-colonial era.

Facing the security environment, President Gloria Macapagal calls the central task for the Philippines one of building "a strong republic." The pillars of her political agenda include breaking terrorism, reducing criminality, addressing socioeconomic concerns, and consolidating, political institutions. In 2003, the Philippines face unresolved questions arising from the Muslim secessionist movement in the south, the communist insurgency, and the implications of its vigorous support for global campaign on anti-

terrorism. Its domestic imperatives require the Philippines to give great importance to international cooperation on global terrorism and strengthen its working relationship with the United States.

Problems related to law and order such as local insurgencies, separatism, criminality, and acts of terrorism continue to preoccupy the country. Police figures showed that violent crimes increased by 25 percent in the first half of 2002, over the same period in the previous year, while robbery and theft were up 40 percent.⁶⁵ In facing the local insurgencies the military and police continue to conduct operations against the New People's Army (NPA), which is the armed wing of the communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgency in Mindanao; and the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) in the extreme south. The Philippines government has intensified suppression efforts against the CPP/NPA as part of its strong agenda, but it still keeps open lines of communication for peace negotiations as part of a continued strategy by combining military and negotiating elements.

B. SEPARATIST ACTS

The religious and ethnic issues have increased significantly, the move away from traditional to modern systems creates a degree of instability, eroding the existing system's socioeconomic and politico-psychological tenets and giving rise to counter-elites and opposition groups, and paving the way for resurgence of racial and ethnic animosities. Although unfamiliar with insurgencies, the Philippine Republic is facing a more complex challenge.⁶⁶ Current separatist violence centers around the Moro Muslims on the Mindanao Island. This phenomenon, however, is not new. For the past 400 years, there has been a simmering struggle to defend the Muslim heartland from the Christian North.⁶⁷ Moro separatist sentiment is underscored by four factors. As mentioned, first is the resentment of Catholic migration from the north. Second is the unwillingness to

⁶⁵ Charles E. Morrison, *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003*, Japan Center for International Exchange, New York 2003, p. 131.

⁶⁶ In the period following the Second World War, the Philippines faced insurgence challenge from the Huks and later from the NPA, the military wing of the Philippine Communist Party. Although the NPA still exists, it has lost much of its stability to influence Philippine politics and is not considered as substantial a threat as the Muslim separatists. However, on August 9, 2002 it was added to the state Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.

⁶⁷ Niholas Tarling, *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume Four: From World War Two to the Present*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 97.

subscribe to Manila's secular civil, politic, judicial and penal constitutional system. Third is the frustration borne of Mindanao's lack of economic and infrastructural development, and the fourth is fear of having religious, cultural, political traditions weakened or destroyed by forced assimilation into the Catholic-dominated Philippine Republic.⁶⁸ The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), which have both used multiple forms of terror, including murder and kidnapping to further their goals, currently wages this separatist struggle. In the early 1990's, the ASG bombed churches, shopping centers and transportation hubs. In 1995, they were linked to a large al-Qaeda plot, Oplan Bojinka, to bomb U.S. airlines as they traveled from Asia to the United States, and in 2000, they initiated a spree of kidnappings involving foreign nationals, primarily with the aim of raising funds.⁶⁹ In many ways, the threat posed to the central authorities by the MILF and ASG is greater than any previous separatist movement. Both groups exhibit a radical fundamentalist Islamic identity that is largely unwilling to compromise on its basic beliefs and demands. Furthermore, both groups appear to be linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and have benefited from training and funding from that organization. Finally, both are able to draw on a personnel resource base that is far from insignificant.⁷⁰

While the military action is largely confined to isolating the specific locations around the country, the terrorist groups have increasingly sought to destabilize the country at large through terrorist tactics directed against urban or symbolic targets. In general, these groups do not act in concert with each other, and often they are not internally coordinated. A particularly vicious series took place in October 2002, targeting shopping centers, buses, bus terminal, and shrines in the southern part of the country. The intelligence community believed that the October 2002 attacks were the work of the Southeast Asia-wide Jemaah Islamiah. Earlier this year, two members of the JI were arrested and jailed for suspected involvement in bomb plots and illegal possession of explosives. When the authorities captured the chief explosive expert Abdulmukim Edris

⁶⁸ Peter Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factors in South Thailand, Mindanao, Aceh," *Study in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24, 4, July-August, 2001, p. 247.

⁶⁹ Paul J. Smith, "Terrorism in Asia: Confronting an Emerging Challenge," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review*, Spring 2002, p. 48.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

in a Manila suburb, they found that they had contact with JI and were planning attacks on the U.S. embassy and others targets in Manila. The terrorist threats further underscored the annoyance of the government when Australia, Canada, and the European Union closed their embassies in late November for a time because of what they found to be specific, credible threats to their facilities and personnel.

Increased terrorist activities continue to affect the performance of the Philippine economy. Nevertheless, the economy remains resilient in the face of both terrorism and the economic weakness in major export markets of the United States and Japan. The Philippine government has substantially strengthened its relations with the U.S. in the context of its anti-terrorism campaign. In spite of the protests from the left, from January through July 2002, 650 U.S. personnel joined Philippine counterparts in Basilan and Zamboanga in the campaign against the ASG.⁷¹ In recognition of the increasing threat of terrorism, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed the agreement on information exchange and established communication procedures to fight terrorism and transnational crime in the region. After the Bali bombing, the president asked that the joint monitoring committee be convened under the agreement. The Philippines also has a defense agreement with five other ASEAN member states covering such items as exchanges of defense personnel, information and intelligence exchanges, and research and development of defense products. The Philippines is also discussing a bilateral anti-terrorism agreement with Australia that may include joint operational and training activities, and another agreement with Germany.

The government affirmed its commitment to the global war against terrorism and its support for the UN Security Council Resolution on states aiding terrorism and the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction. The Philippine National Security Council has approved extending political, security, and humanitarian assistance to the United States. In view of the development gaps in the country, the Philippines is seeking to

⁷¹ Charles E. Morrison, *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003*, Japan Center for International Exchange, New York 2003, p. 131.

revive interest in the Brunei-Indonesia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), a program to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the adjacent area's countries.⁷²

C. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) LINK TO AL-QAEDA

The southern Philippines have suffered from civil unrest and violence for the past three decades, most of which has revolved around the separatist ambitions of the Moro Muslim population in the Mindanao. Never fully colonized by either the Spanish or the United States, this traditionally staunch Islamic enclave has long stood apart from the overwhelmingly Catholic orientation of the Philippine state. General alienation and discontent, however, have been exacerbated by several specific factors, including:

- Economic neglect and general exploitation of local resources to foster development in the central and northern Islands of the Philippines.
- The gradual dispossessions of ancestral lands by Christian settlers (whose transmigration has been explicitly sponsored by Manila to alter the demographic balance in Mindanao).
- Repeated attempts to forcibly assimilate local Muslim communities into the wider Catholic Philippine polity (a policy that became particularly evident during the Marcos era).⁷³

Between 1971 and 1996, the MNLF acted as the main vehicle for armed extremism in the southern Philippines. Led by Nur Misuari, the group dedicated itself to the liberation of all areas where Moro Muslims had traditionally existed as a majority population.⁷⁴ Much of the organization's support during this time derived from the severe social and economic circumstances of the Mindanao, compared with the rest of the Philippines and one in which it is generally accepted that Islamic communities have suffered the most. Reflecting on the ramifications, this has led to conflicts in the region, Amina Rasul – Benardo, a senior at the United States Institute for peace concludes

while all regions (in Mindanao) share in the problem, the burden of poverty lies greatest on Muslims... together, poverty and conflict have perpetuated a vicious cycle. Poverty has fueled conflict by magnifying the

⁷² Ibid, p. 135.

⁷³ Turner and May, 1992.

⁷⁴ Leifer, 1996, pp. 174-175.

sense of marginalization and exclusion. Conflict in turn, aggravated poverty through its effects on people, institution and the economy. Thus, they created the very conditions for their own continuation.⁷⁵

Currently, Osama bin Laden expands his leverage to connect al-Qaeda with MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), and since 1988, he instructed his brother-in-law Muhammad Jammal Khalifa, to go to the Philippines to recruit fighters for the war in Afghanistan. Bin Laden already saw the potential of the Philippines, and he was alarmed at the Moro National Liberation Front's ongoing peace negotiations with the Philippine government. In his eyes, the MNLF was abandoning the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Khalifa traveled to Moro to recruit and facilitate the Jihadis' travel to Pakistan, and in 1991, he established a permanent al-Qaeda network in the Philippines.⁷⁶

D. MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT LINK (MILF) TO JEMAAH ISLAMIAH

Concerned by the deteriorating situation and conditions in Afghanistan, the amir, Abdullah Sungkar made a decision, probably in 1995, to go through the MILF to set up training facilities in Mindanao. Regarding the budget condition and the need for operations immediately, he preferred to choose the Philippines as a site to use and enlarge the training facility. The training area was chosen for many reasons. It was cheaper and easier to send the members of JI to Afghanistan. The minimum training budget's grant came from Abu Sayyap Group and because those funds were temporally unavailable, the training operation would have to be funded out of JI's own resources. Beside that grant, Also Sungkar when collecting money to budget training facilities asked the Singapore and Malaysia wakalahs to contribute 20,000 Malaysian ringgit each, which was about U.S. 3,500.⁷⁷

The arrangement with the MILF was probably made possible by personnel ties. Sungkar was close to MILF leader Salamat Hasim. The relation between MILF and JI was very clear. JI member Fathur Rahman al-Gozali, one of the suspects who was arrested for the bombing in Davao Airport in Mindanao, was also a member of the Abu

⁷⁵ Rasul Benardo, 2002, p. 18.

⁷⁶ Department of National Defense, "The Philippine Campaign Against Terrorism," Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2001.

⁷⁷ Interrogation Deposition of Hasim bin Abas alias Osman Alias Rudi Alias Moh Nuh alias Atan, 10 November 2002, p. 4 in Case Dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

Sayaf Group. In the interrogation process, he told the interrogator that the MILF and JI had a standing agreement. On the one hand, MILF would accommodate JI fighters in the farmer's camps and in return, JI would help MILF guerrilla in conducting bombings in any targeted area until such time that Mindanao could attain its independence.⁷⁸

E. MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) LINK TO AL-QAEDA

Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda had entered the region beginning in the early 1990's, establishing independent cells and assisting and liaising with indigenous Islamic insurgencies that hitherto were believed to have solely domestic agendas. There are four reasons al-Qaeda penetrated this region. First, there have long been militant Muslim groups, who have been fighting for their own homeland like in the Southern Philippines; these groups were seen to have completely domestic agendas and little interest in linking with international organizations. The second, radical Islam is growing for a variety of reasons. These include: economic disparity, the lack of political freedom, the failure of secular education, and an increase number of students studying in the Middle East. Thirdly, the Southeast Asian states have been what might be termed "countries of convenience" for terrorists, with tourist-friendly policies and minimal visa requirements. As a result, they generally lack financial oversight, have well established informal remittance systems for overseas workers, porous borders, often weak central government control, endemic government corruption, and a vast supply of illicit arms. Finally, Southeast Asia's multi-ethnic, tolerant, and secular societies have actually attracted al-Qaeda go into the region.⁷⁹

The growth of Islamic extremism around the world, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, has less to do with theology and more to do with the failure of domestic political economic system of respective Muslim countries. Increasing gaps between the rich and the poor, inequitable distributions of wealth, poverty, level of economic diversity, unemployment, corruption, and the lack of a viable political alternative have all provoked Islamic extremism. People literally have become so desperate that they have nowhere to turn to except extremist religious politics. Their economies slowed and become mired when the Asian economic crisis happened, which gave rise to a reformation and

⁷⁸ "In Terror Pact-City Airport, Seaport Bombing Part of Plot," *The Mindanao Times*, 16 April 2003.

⁷⁹ Zachary Abuza, "Tentacle of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network", 2002, p. 428.

democratic movement. Islamic extremism was then able to take hold and enter the mainstream. The lower economic performance weakened in support of security equipment and facilities.

It may seem strange to think of Islamic-based terrorism as having ties with devoutly Catholic Philippines. However, according to U.S. officials,

the Philippines have become a major operations hub to al-Qaeda. Some of the worst terrorist plots in recent memory were planned in the Philippines. In particular, one plot was to shoot down eleven U.S. airlines in the 48 hours of terror.

Moreover, every major terrorist plot by al-Qaeda against the United States has had ties to the Philippines.⁸⁰

Currently, the MILF is the leading Muslim rebel movement fighting the Philippines government. The Philippine government continues to enter negotiations with the movement. Nonetheless, whereas the MILF have legitimate national liberation aspirations, it has forged linkages with international terrorist groups, namely al-Qaeda. The root of MILF contact with al-Qaeda dates back to the period of the soviet invasion of Afghanistan, MILF sent an estimated 700 Filipino Muslims undergoing military training to join the Mujahiddin.⁸¹ Established in the Philippines, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Jamal Mohammed Khalifa, began to provide covert assistance to the MILF financially and through training. In Addition, he provided covert assistance by funding development projects zones under MILF control, or areas that constituted core constituencies of MILF support. Al-Qaeda has placed a large number of instructors in MILF camps since the mid-1990's, not just to assist the MILF, but also for other jihadis in the region, such as the Malaysian Kumpulan Mujahiddin, Jemaah Islamiah, and Laskar Jundullah.⁸²

The link between the MILF and al-Qaeda are very well established. There is ample evidence that during the 1990's the MILF received funding and training from al-Qaeda operatives. For the most part, this money comes through the al-Qaeda network

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 435.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., p. 438.

established by Jamal Mohammad Khalifa, in particular IIRO (Islamic International Relief Organization). The linkages were both ideological and personnel. The MILF, in Osama bin Laden's eyes, was worthy of finding. The relationship between the MILF and al-Qaeda was significant, and the Philippine intelligence intercepted regular telephone calls between Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda operations officer, now in U.S. custody and Salamat Hashim, Yusof Alongon (the head of the MILF Finance Committee) and Abdu Naser Nooh (the MILF's liaison officer in Manila).⁸³

F. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP'S (ASG) LINK TO AL-QAEDA

The small group but more violent than the MILF in the southern Philippines is the Abu Sayyaf Group. Abu Sayaf Group was formed in the early 1990's, and its early days, proclaimed religious fervor, it has become a criminal gang engaged in murder and kidnapping for ransom, striking not only in the Philippines but also in Malaysia. The Abu Sayaf Group generally regarded by the Philippines government as a ragtag group of bandits with no broader aim than to enrich themselves. The group's focus is in the southern Philippines; it possesses neither the intention nor the capability to strike the United States. Although it may have had some early contacts with al-Qaeda operatives in the mid 1990's, at that time there is no evidence that these have continued, especially since Abu Sayaf now funds itself through kidnappings, which have exceeded \$20 million. Abu Sayaf is more in the tradition of southern Philippine pirates.⁸⁴

The origin of the Abu Sayyaf can be traced to Afghanistan. There were between 300 and 600 Moro fundamentalists in Peshawar, Pakistan in the early 1980s. One of them was the son of local Ulama, Ustadz Adularia Janjalani, who emerged as the leader. He had attended an Islamic university in Libya and Saudi Arabia before joining the Mujahidin and fighting the Soviets for several years. The Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence documents indicate that Khalifa financed Janjalani's studies in Syria and Libya.⁸⁵ In Peshawar, Janjalani befriended Osama bin Laden. Janjalani was committed to waging a jihad back in his native Philippines to create a pure Islamic state

⁸³ Ibid., p. 439.

⁸⁴ Erict Smitt, "U.S. and Philippine Setting up Joint Command to Combat Terror," *New York Times*, January 16, 2002.

⁸⁵ Department of Interior and Local Government, "Country Report of the Republic of the Philippines," p. 6.

in the Moro Island based on Salafi Washabasin. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Janjalani began making frequent trips between his home in Basilan and the Peshawar-Afghan border to recruit supporters. When Osama bin Laden wanted to expand his al-Qaeda network, he turned to Janjalani to establish a cell in Southeast Asia.

PNP intelligence documents suggest that it was Ramzi Yoesup who had encouraged the formation of the Abu Sayyaf Group to serve as his contact and support group in the Philippines. At that time, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World trade Center bombing, was teaching at the Khost camp in 1990. Yousef and Janjalani struck up a close friendship in early 1991.⁸⁶ Responding to an Osama bin Laden request, Yousef and Janjalani traveled to the Philippines where he trained Abu Sayyaf Group members in bomb-making in their camp in Basilan Island.

The connection between the Abu Sayyaf Groups with al-Qaeda become clear when it was proved that in 1991, the ASG received some P12 million in grants from foreign sources, mainly from al-Qaeda, but also from Libya.⁸⁷ On 29 January 1992, the ASG received some P 160,000 from Khalifa. The ASG began to receive large deliveries of weapons from Victor Blout, a Tajik arms dealer who was later linked to both the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda.⁸⁸ Through his sermons and notoriety following a series of kidnappings and massacres, other gangs of Moro brigands in the Sulu Island began to accept Janjalani as their chief.⁸⁹

The Abu Sayyaf Group grew in strength when it began receiving more al-Qaeda funding. Most recently, in 2000 and 2001, the Abu Sayyaf Group refocused its tactics operation to kidnap western targets and to rob tourist resorts for ransom, and occasionally, beheading victims during negotiations. The families, corporations and foreign governments (including Libya) have negotiated within ASG to expand and improve its arsenal. The money has attracted additional followers and communities have

⁸⁶ Simon Reeve, "The New Jackals," (Boston: Northeast University Press, 1999. p. 156.).

⁸⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2001.

⁸⁸ Donald G. McNeil, "Belgium Seeks Arm Deals with Suspected Al-Qaeda Ties," *New York Times*, February 27, 2002).

⁸⁹ Tim McGirk "Perpetually Perilous," *Asia Time*, June 18, 2001.

somewhat improved relations to the victims that have suffered because of ASG rape. The core of ASG membership generally runs about 200 fighters and numbers are drawn mostly from young, educated Muslim students who often have had opportunities (ASG provide funding for Muslim student).⁹⁰

G. COMPREHENSIVENESS

Political terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. Today, the reasons for political violence in the region can be linked to ethnic unrest, religious disputes, political deprivation, and economic frustration. However, it can be argued that most of post-colonial Southeast Asia's problems date back to the time when arbitrary borders were drawn purely to satisfy the desires of Western colonizers. As a result, the governments of Southeast Asia are faced with the tasks of trying to contain significant sectors of population that do not identify strongly either with their national rulers or territorial boundaries. This phenomenon is evident for archipelago countries like in the Philippines.

There are indications that the threat of terrorism is spreading in Southeast Asia despite being traditionally seen as a symptom indicative of the Middle East. In the past, countries in Southeast Asia have dealt with threats of internal stability on their own or from assistance from former colonial rulers. Terrorism has brought the threat of further instability to countries in Southeast Asia that no longer enjoy the benefits of rapid economic growth and long-standing political arrangements. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Philippines. If the "Asian economic flu" is an indication of how terrorism can spread throughout this region, Southeast Asia cannot afford to combat terrorism without aiding from one another countries in the region Southeast Asia or beyond its.

The terrorist incidents occur more widely in democratic, free societies. This is partly because of the opportunity to act and partly because of the potential advantage of publicity. While terrorism does occur in the more controlled societies (and the very nature of such societies means that we may hear far less about their terrorism than might be justified by actual events), the control of citizens' movements, work, political activities, and media, limits both opportunity and the potential payoff. The greatest

⁹⁰ The Terrorism Research Center; Terrorist Group Profiles, June 2003.

potential for future terrorist threats lies predominantly in Indonesia and the Philippines as archipelago countries. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the countries current financial crisis may spark a general outbreak of political violence as the public reacts to higher food prices, lower wages, job losses, and forced devaluation of savings.

Through the support of Jamaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda has reportedly organized a very strong network terrorist group in Southeast Asia with two sorts of operations. First, al-Qaeda sets up independent terrorist cells in the region, usually with a handful of members, some of whom are Arabs staying in Southeast Asia. Second, al-Qaeda capitalizes on political dissent or poverty to take over organizations or companies and turn them into cogs within its terrorist network.⁹¹ Among countries in Southeast Asia Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are the major Southeast Asian countries with active local terrorist groups and with very strong al-Qaeda connections. Indonesia serves as the largest of an Asian terrorist network; Malaysia has been identified as the perfect place for terrorist rest and recreation. While the Philippines, on the other hand, has played an important role in one of the training areas for al-Qaeda terrorist fighters. These regional networks of terrorist fighters have a goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to parts of the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar.⁹²

Based on some cooperation among the ASEAN states exist. Intelligence exchanges on terrorism take place, leading to surveillance of suspected groups, and local coast guards have increased their protective watch over freighters and accompanying U.S. warships through the Strait Malacca.⁹³ Most of this cooperation has been bilateral; however, with agreements to strengthen intelligence sharing occurring when heads of states visit one another. A positive result from these bilateral understandings occurred in January 2002 when Malaysia sent renegade Muslim leader of the Philippine MILF, Nur Misauri, back to Manila after he had led a short-lived insurrection in Mindanao.

⁹¹ Richard Hallooran, "Al-Qaeda Network Believed Thriving in Indonesia," *Washington Times*, July 30, 2002.

⁹² Maria Ressa, "The Quest for SE Asia's Islamic Super State: 1995 Report Forewarned of U.S. Terror Attack."

⁹³ Philippine Daily Inquire (Internet Version), February 8, 2002, in FBIS, Daily Report East Asia, February 11, 2002.

Indonesia has also sent police specialists to the Philippines to assist in the investigation of suspected terrorist Fathur Rohman Al Gozali, an Indonesian with links to the militant Jemaah Islamiah.

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V. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA AND U.S. COUNTERING TERRORISM POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions-by abandoning every value except the will to power-they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that the path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

President George W. Bush

A. INTRODUCTION

The level and character of the threat posed by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is difficult to estimate precisely. It is not fully clear, for example, whether al-Qaeda has tight linkages with regional networks (like Jamaah Islamiah) or whether the regionally based groups operate with more limited liaison or advice from al-Qaeda. It is clear, however, that there has been some al-Qaeda involvement in of these, and that a major threat continues, as the Bali bombings have tragically illustrated.

Since the attack in the United States on 11 September 2001, efforts have increased to coordinate regional and international actions against terrorism in Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced increased cooperation at its annual ministerial meetings in July to August 2002. During these meetings, the United States also signed an anti-terrorism agreement with ASEAN members on 30 July 2002.⁹⁴

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is being pursued in an environment in which locally-derived factors have contributed to the basis of support for the groups involved. Increased efforts are needed to pursue law-enforcement measures in regional states- a task which is especially difficult in the case of Indonesia.⁹⁵ However, further attention will also be needed to alleviate the social, political and economic disadvantage that has fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions such as in Indonesia and the Southern

⁹⁴ Frank Frost, "Terrorism in Southeast Asia Analysis and Policy," the Parliamentary Library Web Manager Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, p. 6.

⁹⁵ Stephen Sherlock, "The Bali Bombing: What It Means for Indonesia," *Current Issues Brief*, October 22, 2002.

Philippines. With these conditions, the world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedom and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at war.

We know well, as mentioned in the previous chapter the characteristic of the terrorist. In this case, certainly, the enemy is not religion. The enemy is terrorism-premeditated and politically motivated violence that is perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. Those who employ terrorism, regardless of their specific secular or religious objectives strive to subvert the rule of law and effect change through violence and fear. These terrorist also share the misguided belief that killing, kidnapping, extorting, robbing, and wreaking havoc to terrorize people are legitimate forms of political action.

The struggle against regional, international terrorism is different from any other war. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national, regional, international power, diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military means available. The terrorist organization in Southeast Asia is radical Islamic that communicates and operates across national boundaries. Collaboration among the region's governments is essential if the terrorist's are going to be disrupted. The United States, with its unique and powerful abilities can build partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, will lead the fight against transnational and international terrorist organizations of global reach, by striking constantly and ensuring that terrorists have no place to hide. Working together, we will compress their scope and reduce the capability of these organizations by creating the partnerships that will facilitate regional solutions that further isolate the spread of terrorism.

The Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 has directed attention to the issues that Southeast Asia is a region conducive to the activities of both domestic and international terrorist groups, and that elements of the two have been closely interlinked. The

bombings have also emphasized that at a time when world attention is being directed toward the problem of Iraq, the “war on terror” pursued since September 11, 2001 is far from won.

Southeast Asia had episodes of political violence which have either been explicitly or closely linked to terrorism. These have included activities by communist groups (for example the Communist Political Party movement in the Philippines) and activities directed against ruling communist regimes (such as the bomb attack in Laos in 2000 and 2001). Terrorism has also at times been state-sponsored or condoned, as in the case of Christian anti-separatist groups in the southern Philippines (opposing Muslim secessionist) and militias in East Timor, Papua and other parts of Indonesia.

With the strong presence of al-Qaeda’s network of terrorism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. has decided to return to the region and declared Southeast Asia as “the second front” in its global war on terrorism. Destroying al-Qaeda’s terrorist network in Southeast Asia has become an important component of its global campaign against terrorism. The main American blueprint in the global campaign against terrorism is the national strategy for combating terrorism as released by the White House in February 2003. In this document, the White House has recognized that terrorism has a very long history. Additionally, it acknowledges that the September 11 terrorist attack was one of a kind using the advent of information communication technology to wreak havoc in the global community.⁹⁶

B. U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Providing support for counter terrorism in Southeast Asia is not easy. It has been argued that the American failure in Vietnam was directly related to an inability and an unwillingness to understand insurgency as a unique part of political-military strategy.⁹⁷ Declaring a global war against terrorists without analyzing the local dynamics risks the same result. The key toward successful counter-terrorist policy in Southeast Asia,

⁹⁶ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *The War on the Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, Inc., Quezon City, p. 63, 2003.

⁹⁷ Donal W. Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia*, p. 155.

therefore, is identifying the groups that threaten U.S. interests as a whole, monitoring and determining their modus operandi, thus tailoring counter-terrorist efforts to eliminate the threat.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it has long been a tactic of regional guerillas and insurgents who have attempted to change the political structure of their target state. It also demonstrated that contemporary terrorist activity is associated more with communal or religious violence than with the anti-American “war” being waged internationally by “al-Qaeda and the regional terrorism namely Jemaah Islamiah.” That is not to say, however, that U.S. interests in the region are immune from attack. It has been suggested that terrorists attack U.S. targets because they perceive that the United States is a hegemonic super power that intervenes in the affairs of other nations or groups. Moreover, there is a perception that “globalization” is “Americanization” and, therefore, destructive to local cultures, customs, and religions thus putting the United States into terrorist crosshairs.

Counter-terrorism strategy is, in fact, a reiteration of an earlier document articulating the overall national security strategy of the United States. In the American National Strategy released a year after the September 11 terrorist attack, the White House underscored that its priority is to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach, and attack their leadership; command, control, and communication; material support; and finances.⁹⁸ In this strategy, the White House claims that it will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

- Direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power.
- Defending the United States, the American people, their interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it is at their borders.
- Denying further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ The White House, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 5.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

Southeast Asia is an important region in America's war against global terrorism. Disrupting and destroying the vestiges of terrorism in Southeast Asia is the top American objective in the region. In fact, when President George Bush assumed office, he already had the intention of strengthening U.S. involvement and engagement in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁰

To intensify its countering terrorism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. is deepening and widening its bilateral security alliances and partnerships with countries in the region to "allow for the creation of a comprehensive security network in the Asia-Pacific region."¹⁰¹ The strongest network, so far, is in the Philippines. Other networks have been established in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand.

To enhance cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asia in combating terrorism, ASEAN and the U.S. State Department signed on 1 August 2002 the U.S.-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in Brunei Darussalam. The agreement binds Southeast Asia and the United States "To prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism."¹⁰² Prior to the signing of the ASEAN-U.S. anti-terrorism declaration, ASEAN had passed on 5 November 2001, the Joint Action to Counter Terrorism to "unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attack against humanity and the assault on all of us." In this joint action, ASEAN members are also urged to undertake the following practical measures:

- Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism.
- Call for the early signing/ratification of our accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism.
- Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing "best practices."

¹⁰⁰ Gaye Christofferson, "The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Search for Partner, Delimiting Targets," Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategy Insights: East Asia 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰¹ Angel M. Rabasa, "Southeast Asia after 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interest" (Testimony presented to the subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific House of representative Committee on International Relations on December 2001), p. 9.

¹⁰² "U.S. - ASEAN Sign Landmark Anti-Terror Pact," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 1, 2002, At [http://www.inq7.net/wnw/2002/aug/02/wnw_1-1.htm].

- Study relevant international conventions of terrorism with the view toward integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism.
- Enhance information and intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, poverty and the security of all modes of travel.
- Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid toward finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice.
- Develop regional capacity building programs to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts.
- Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners with existing frameworks such as the ASEAN +3, the ASEAN dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavor.
- Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.¹⁰³

The U.S. finds it imperative to be actively re-engaged in Southeast Asian security affairs because its motive goes beyond anti-terrorism. The U.S. has greater strategic intentions concerning the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. These strategy intentions are to contain China, to promote American economic interests in Southeast Asia, and to control sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea.¹⁰⁴

C. THE PHILIPPINES PERSPECTIVE IN FACING THE TERRORIST ACT

The Philippines were the first ASEAN state to declare the strongest support to the United States' counter to terrorism. Manila even expressed willingness to deploy Philippine troops to Afghanistan once approved by the Philippine Congress. The Philippines also offered its territory to the United States as transit points or staging areas

¹⁰³ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, Inc. Quezon City, 2003, p. 69.

¹⁰⁴ American Foreign and Security Policy in the Aftermath of September 11 Terrorist Attack; see "Post-9/11 Foreign Policy" at: [http://www.cooperatioresearch.org/post_9/11_foreign_policy.htm], Accessed on May 15, 2003.

of troops fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited the United States in November 2002, she reiterated her administration's full support for the United States' counter-terrorism efforts.

Prior to the visit, the Philippine government formed the International Agency Task Force against International Terrorism on 24 September 2001. This International Agency aims to coordinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines. To freeze the financial assets of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress passed the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 29 September 2001. President Arroyo also announced on 12 October 2001 her fourteen pillar approach to combat terrorism as stated below.

- Designate a Cabinet Oversight Committee on international security as the nation's anti-terrorism body.
- Seek to consolidate intelligence projects.
- Call on the armed Forces and the Philippine National police to address terrorists.
- Hold accountable all public and private organizations abetting terrorism,
- Seek regional consensus and cooperation especially with Indonesia and Malaysia in the war against terrorism.
- Anticipate legal issues and concerns.
- Pursue Christian-Muslim dialogue and seek to promote ecumenism.
- Call for greater vigilance and concrete measures against all possible terrorist supplies, materials and finances.
- Mobilize disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic attack;
- Secure critical infrastructure.
- Protect overseas workers and seek their immediate transfer if needed.
- Seek the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFN/PNP modernization program.
- Ask for media responsibility.
- Seek to address the socio-economic and political roots of perceived fanaticism and irrational violence.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, Inc. Quezon City, 2003, p. 47.

On the basis of the fourteen pillars to combat terrorism, the Philippine government also issued General Order Nr. 2 on May 2002 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippine National Police to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in Mindanao. Together with General Order Nr. 2, the Philippine government also issued on the same day the Memorandum Order Nr. 61 to provide support for quelling the acts of terrorism in the Southern Philippines.

D. INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE IN FACING THE TERRORIST ACT

Indonesia condemned the September 11th attacks and expressed its readiness to cooperate with any United Nations collective action against terrorism. President Megawati was the first Muslim leader in Asia who visited the White House. On 19 September 2001, President Megawati met President Bush and exchanged pledges to strengthen existing cooperation in the global effort to combat international terrorism. Bush also promised to lift the embargo on commercial sales of non – lethal military items to Indonesia.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, on 5 October 2001 the Indonesian government issued a four – point statements on terrorist, which stated that: 1) Indonesia is committed and ready to cooperate with the international community in fighting terrorism; 2) Indonesia's support initiative would work through the United Nations; 3) All action in retaliation should be proportional; and 4) All parties should avoid open war.

Indonesian support for the United States' led campaign against terrorism has improved the U.S.-Indonesia military relations. Since the early 1990's, Indonesian-America military ties have been on hold in reaction to the 1992 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili and the perceived human rights violations in East Timor. Driven by the United States' war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, the American and Indonesian governments have found the opportunity to rebuild their ties.¹⁰⁷

The United States Department of Defense has openly pursued the restoration of a full military-to-military relationship with Indonesia.¹⁰⁸ Notwithstanding the United

¹⁰⁶ Kurd Bidle, Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ ICG, Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Reyco Huang, "Priority Dilemmas: U.S.-Indonesia Military Relation in the Anti-Terror War," Centre of Defense Information Terrorism Project, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism_pr.cfm], Accessed on February 8, 2002.

States congressional ban on military-to-military ties with Indonesia, the United States Congress passed a bill in December 2001 allowing the Indonesia military to participate in the United States initiated counter-terrorism training and programs.

Despite these positive developments in United States-Indonesia relations, Jakarta remains critical of the United States' global war against terrorism.

Indonesia demanded the United States not target a specific country in its war on terrorism arguing that it would affect U.S. investments in that country.¹⁰⁹ When the U.S. asked that all "civilized states to block financial support for terrorist movements," Indonesia also displayed a lukewarm reaction because of thousands of Islamic charities in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁰ To scrutinize those charities in its own country would risk a significant Muslim backlash, not to mention coming from overseas and non-government organizations.¹¹¹

Nonetheless, Indonesia regarded the U.S. war on terrorism as an opportunity to resume U.S. - Indonesian military relations, especially in light of separatist and sectarian violence in Aceh, the Malucas, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. Jakarta knows that the United States can be of great assistance in combating its own terrorism problems.

One of the strategic interests of Indonesia from the United States, in the countering of terrorism, was acquiring military assistance and training. The United States Department has requested that Congress appropriate \$16 million to assist Indonesia in training its police in counter-terrorism and its military in domestic peacekeeping operations. The United States State Department has also requested an additional \$400,000 for training civilians in security studies under the International Military and Education Training (IMET) and \$17.9 million for combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Gaye Christofferson, "The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Search for Partners, Delimiting Target," p. 1, [<http://ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/mar02/east Asia.asp>].

¹¹⁰ Simon SC Tay, "East Asia after 11 Sept" (Paper delivered at the opening plenary session of the World Economic Forum, East Asia Summit held in Hong Kong on October 2001), p. 4.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² ICG, "Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties," pp. 1-2.

The Bali bombings have unleashed a tremendous negative impact on Indonesia's response to the global campaign against terrorism. The bombing created an internal and international problem for Indonesia.

Internally, the bombing resulted in the decline of popularity of President Megawati. Before the bombing, Megawati's popularity was so high that it almost assured her of re-election in 2004. Her popularity eroded after the bombings. Although she went immediately to Bali in the aftermath of the bombings and held various cabinet meetings in those days, Indonesians still "saw no effort on her part to direct policy or to bring her unruly cabinet into line to convey the image of a united government with a sense of purpose".¹¹³

Economically, the Bali bombings left deep economic and social scars on Indonesia. Before, Bali was a tourist center in Indonesia; now it has become a ghost town.¹¹⁴ Demands for local hotels have dropped to 27 percent after the bombing and most major foreign tourist agencies have put travel to Bali on hold.¹¹⁵ While international business has promised to stay, "the departure of non-essential diplomats and dependents from some embassies, together with travel warnings from many more, are clearly going to hurt."¹¹⁶

Internationally, many states expressed sympathy with Indonesia but the bombings have also caused enormous worries, especially among affected countries like Australia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Because of the adverse impact the Bali bombing have caused to Indonesia, Megawati's government adopted two anti-terrorism regulations. One anti-terrorism regulation is called "government regulation in lieu of law" as part of Nr. 1/2002 on the eradication of terrorist act. It contains 47 articles; the crucial points of this regulation are:

- The new regulation defines terrorism as any violent act that could create terror or insecurity among the public, violate the public's freedom, cause the death of other people or cause the destruction of vital strategic objects.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

- These crimes are then broken down into detailed acts, ranging from petty acts such as the issuing of bogus threats such as using a nuclear weapon to create terror.
- A corporation involved in terrorist acts can be fined up to Rp 1 trillion and have its rational license revoked.
- Unlike the criminal code, the anti-terrorism regulation allows intelligence reports to be used as legal evidence.
- Based on prima facie evidence, suspected terrorists can be arrested for seven days and detained for a period of six months for questioning and prosecution.
- Investigators also have the authority to go through personal mail and parcels, and to tap telephone conversations or other forms of communication, with the actual tapping being permissible for a period of up to one year.
- Investigators, prosecutors and judges are given the power under this regulation to block any bank accounts belonging to suspected terrorists or to those allegedly funding terrorist activities.
- The state also has the obligation to pay compensation and restitution to the victims of terrorist acts.
- The Government Regulation in lieu of law Nr. 2/2002 allows retroactively bringing the perpetrators of the Bali bombing attack to justice.¹¹⁷

This government regulation combines categories and investigations of acts of terrorism, and its concomitant punishments. As mentioned above, another anti-terrorism law is called regulation Nr. 2/2002 on the Enactment of government Regulation In-Lieu of Law Nr. 1/2002. The government regulation in lieu of Law Nr. 2/2002 is considered an umbrella to all other regulations dealing with the elimination of crimes of terrorism. Regulation 2/2002 also contains two articles relating to the investigation on the horrendous Bali bombing. At the same time, Presidential Instruction Nr. 4 / 2002 gives authority to the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs to coordinate steps to fight terrorism and Presidential Instruction Nr. 5 of 2002 gives authority to the National Intelligence Agency to coordinate intelligence activities.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Leonardo C. Sebastian, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Indonesia's New Anti-Terrorism Regulation, pp. 3-4, Published on November 2002.

¹¹⁸ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, *Save Our Country from Terrorism*, Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, December 2002, Preface, p. iii.

All these measures are in agreement with Indonesia's commitment to combating terrorism as a threat to national and international peace and security and are regarded as serious strategic steps of Indonesia.

E. COUNTER –TERRORISM

With regard to the reality that Southeast Asia radical Islamic terrorist organizations or cells communicate and operate across boundaries, collaboration among the region's governments is essential if they are going to be disrupted. The office of counter-terrorism within the Department of State coordinates all United States government efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments. Modern terrorists are inherently international. Therefore, many countries perceive that they have a shared interest in enhancing international cooperation in order to suppress those forms of terrorism that they believe to be a threat to their national security.¹¹⁹ The main value of a multilateral agreement lies in setting international standards and symbolizing general awareness of international problems.¹²⁰ In light of this assertion, diplomacy must lead the United States' efforts to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia. Multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) assist in forging substantive agreements that will enhance the sharing of information, tighten border agreements, and reinforce law enforcement cooperation. For example, the United States-ASEAN joint declaration on counter-terrorism, among other goals, pledges to share intelligence, block terrorist funds, tighten borders, and crack down on forged travel documents.

Responding to domestic concerns over United States involvement in Afghanistan, the new pre-emptive war doctrine and the fear of further United States military activity in Muslim countries, some ASEAN nations and Indonesia in particular, rejected United States pressure to drop ASEAN's fundamental concept of non-interference in the

¹¹⁹ Paul Wikinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, p. 118.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 119.

domestic affairs of others.¹²¹ A compromise was therefore reached whereby the signatories recognize and incorporated into a declaration “the principal of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.”

Nevertheless, multilateral diplomacy, as demonstrated in the ASEAN-U.S. joint declaration, can provide a formal structure for making demands and implementing response without the taint of being solely the work of the United States.¹²² These structures can include conventions or resolutions that bind signatories to the stated goal, and these resolutions can be useful in that they reinforce an international norm against the use of terrorism, and thirdly, they provide a common standard that facilitates cooperation on various matters.¹²³

One must be wary, however, of ASEAN’s multilateral past. Because of the adherence to non-interference in the internal affairs of other states a serious problem inherent in the so-called “ASEAN way” – cautions that diplomacy is the norm. Conflict is dealt with internally by postponing difficult issues or compartmentalization of cooperation. The result is that few contentious issues are solved.¹²⁴ Instead, they are left to fester. Thus, multilateralism for ASEAN has also meant inaction and paralysis in many areas.

There is, however, much to be encouraged about. Although after the terror attack against the United States, Prime Minister Mahatir initially opposed any resolution backing U.S. military action, arguing that ASEAN should only endorse a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning terrorism. ASEAN rejected Mahatir’s attempt to go on record against U.S. action and instead issued a statement condemning terrorism and the attack on the United States as “an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us.”¹²⁵

Another function of diplomacy is its support of U.S. criminal law, particularly in the prosecution of terrorist whose acts are committed against American interests

¹²¹ Brenden Pereira, ASEAN Countries Benefit from Anti-Terror Pact, *The Strait Time*, August 3, 2002.

¹²² Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 76.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 77.

¹²⁴ Shoun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way,” *Asian Survey* XXXVII, October 10, 1997, p. 94.

¹²⁵ Sheldon W. Simon, Southeast Asia and the U.S. War on Terrorism the National Bureau Research Analysis.

overseas. The Omnibus Terrorist Act of 1986 made terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens abroad a federal crime and authorized extraterritorial arrest and trial in U.S. courts.¹²⁶ This is a particularly difficult task in light of two issues. The first is the abhorrence by many nations of the death penalty and its application in the Anti-terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA), where it is prescribed for various terrorist crimes against Americans. Second, and more importantly from a foreign policy perspective, is the fact that in implementing extraterritoriality, the U.S. is asking other governments to yield in ways that the United States itself would be unlikely to yield.¹²⁷

Extraterritoriality in the prosecution of terrorists, therefore, is heavily dependent upon the cooperation of other states, thus placing the burden on diplomatic efforts on the United Nations and other regions to permit U.S. counter-terrorist policy. That is, it requires the application of international coercion through economic sanctions against state sponsors. Although the United States can and has instituted unilateral sanctions, it is clear that only multilateral sanctions can achieve the full effect of the sanctions' intent. Moreover it has been asserted that unilateral sanctions may in fact cause the sanctioned state and its population to become more recalcitrant.¹²⁸

Terrorism is a direct challenge to the economic growth for developing countries in Southeast Asia. Countering the terrorist threat remains a high priority. The Department of State of the United States of America has developed a three-part, counter- terrorist policy that is claimed to have worked well over the years such as:

- Make no concessions to terrorists.
- Bring terrorists to justice for the crime.
- Isolate and apply pressure on the state that sponsors and supports them to change its behavior.¹²⁹

Other strategies to counter terrorists also exist, and are included in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. They are:

¹²⁶ Ian O. Lesser, et al., *Countering the New Terrorism*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999, p. 113.

¹²⁷ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Bookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 76.

¹²⁸ David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The U.S. and International Terrorism*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997.

¹²⁹ "Introduction" *Pattern of Global Terrorism*: 1997, p. 85.

- Destroy the terrorists and their organization.
- End the state sponsorship of terrorism.
- Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism.
- Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorism.
- Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the emergence of terrorism.
- Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad.¹³⁰

With regard to the economic aspect in countering terrorism, the Leaders of APEC (APEC leaders' statement on fighting terrorism, Los Cabos Mexico, 26 October 2002) are determined to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation in line with specific circumstances in their respective economies, through:

- Appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of funds to terrorists, including accelerating work on combating financial crimes.
- Adherence by all economies of all relevant international requirements for the security of air and maritime transportation, and transport ministers to enhance airport, aircraft, and port security, achieve effective outcomes as early as possible, and assure full implementation in this regard.
- Strengthen energy security in the region through the mechanism of the Energy Security Initiative, which examines measures to respond to temporary supply disruption and longer term challenges facing the region's energy supply.
- Increase the activities in the area of critical sector protection, including telecommunications, transportations, health and energy.
- Enhance custom communication networks as, and expeditious development of, a global integrated electronic custom network, which would allow customs authorities to better enforce laws while minimizing the impact on the flow of trade.
- Cooperate to develop an electronic movement records system that will enhance border security while ensuring that legitimate travelers are not inconvenienced.
- Strengthen economic building and technical cooperation to enable member economies to put into place and enforce effective counter-terrorism measures.

¹³⁰ U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorist, February 2003, pp. 17-27.

- Cooperate to limit economic fallout from the attacks and move to restore economic confidence in the region through policies and measures that increase economic growth as well as provide a stable environment for trade, investment, travel and tourism.¹³¹

The primary tenet of the United States and Southeast Asia counter-terrorism policy is to make no concession to terrorists; conversely, al-Qaeda's *raison d'être* is to destroy the United States. Therefore, the only viable response is to destroy al-Qaeda and its affiliates like Jemaah Islamiah by using all counter-terrorist means, including military force.

However, the United States must carefully weigh the likely strategic, political and economic consequences of any offensive action taken overseas against international terrorists and their bases, their personnel and where relevant, their state sponsors.

¹³¹ APEC Leaders Statement on Fighting Terrorism, Los Cabos, Mexico, October 2002.

VI. CONCLUSION

Since the early 1990's, terrorism has undergone profound changes. New adversaries, with new motivations and new rationales surfaced to challenge much of the conventional wisdom covering both terrorists and terrorism. Critically, many analysts both internal and external to government were slow to recognize these changes, or even worse, dismissed them. Accordingly, throughout most of the 1990's our conceptions and policies remained largely the same, dating from terrorism's emergence as a global security problem more than thirty years before. These conceptions originated and took hold during the Cold War when radical left-wing terrorist groups then active through the world were widely regarded as posing the most serious threat to western security.¹³² The situation during the 1990's strengthened our notions of the "stereotypical-type terrorist organization."

The groups of terrorists, for example, were once recognizable mostly as a collection of individuals belonging to a specific organization with well-defined command and control apparatuses, who were engaged in conspiracy as a full-time avocation, living underground while constantly planning and plotting terrorist attacks and who at times were under the direct control, or operating at the express behest of some foreign government. These groups, moreover, had a defined set of political, social or economic objectives and often issued communiqués taking credit for and explaining their actions. Accordingly, however disagreeable or repugnant the terrorists and their tactics may have been, we at least knew who they were and what they wanted.

With regard to the identifiable patterns in the choice of tactics and targets, bombs and guns were the favorite tools of traditional terrorist groups, with an emphasis on bombing. This is because, while requiring only limited efforts and resources, bombing provided a good output. Also, when used as a form of indiscriminate violence, it became increasing fatal and more disruptive. With respect to targets, diplomatic, government, businesses area, entertainment places and economic centers, as well as military targets,

¹³² Holt, Rinehart and Winston, *The Secret War of International Terrorism*, New York, 1981

are currently favorite, yet indiscriminate targeting is becoming more common. Although discrete targets are likely to remain the same, contemporary terrorism effects a broader dimension of the population than terrorism did in the past.

Of the many possible explanations for why people become terrorists, one powerful view offered by terrorism studies is that men are driven to rebel by a combination of political repression and acute socio-economic deprivation. Individuals become radicalized and vulnerable to extremist appeals when governments not only fail to deliver economic growth, decent jobs, adequate health care and affordable education, but also suppress the ensuing protest from the people in the interest of regime stability.

Social and economic development policies also expand a new middle class in communities that has traditionally used the hand of terrorism to further their own interests. On the other hand, in certain cases, this section of the population has recognized the economic benefit of peace and, as a result, has worked to inhibit local support for terrorist activities. In Indonesia, for example the new middle class (and business elite) have emerged that directly obtained benefits from the development programs. Commercial interest groups have also acted as a brake on elite business and loyalist violence, discouraging the retaliatory riots and attacks that traditionally occur during economically developing periods.

Over the long run, Southeast Asian countries must change the political, social and economic milieu that breeds terrorism. Specifically, socio-economic development in the Southern Philippines, economic recovery in Indonesia, the restoration of law and order in the Molucas and Sulawesi, and an equitable political solution to the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya must be sought. Internal security in Southeast Asia is poor. Until these capabilities are enhanced and socio-economic deficits erased, terrorism will continue to flourish regardless of outside efforts to eradicate it.¹³³

Many terrorist organizations attract new members in communities in which terrorism is generally considered a viable response to perceived grievances. Some terrorist groups also offer recruits financial incentives and additional family support, in short they offer benefits. Social and economic development policies can help reduce the

¹³³ Sheldon W. Simon, 2002, p. 9.

pools of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and by providing the members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism. For example, two development projects in the southern Philippines—asparagus and banana production—have been particularly effective in providing economic alternatives to communities that have traditionally lent a high degree of support to local terrorist groups.¹³⁴

Recently, private investment has resulted in almost total employment and transformed an area previously known as “the killing fields of Mindanao” into a largely peaceful community.¹³⁵ However, of course, not all terrorist recruits come from poorer communities. Depending on the region and the nature of the conflict, terrorism can just as easily come from the middle class or upper classes. In the countries I examined, extremist groups were recruited across the class spectrum, with general support from local communities.

For social and economic policies to be effective, they need to be funded according to the relative size, geography, and needs of targeted communities. If development initiatives lack sufficient financial support, they are likely to act as a double-edged sword, erroneously inflating the hopes and aspirations of local communities. When their expectations are not met, there is an increased chance that social economic and policies will backfire, triggering resentment and renewed support for terrorist violence.¹³⁶ Any one country, regardless of that nation’s power or influence within Southeast Asia, cannot defeat terrorist violence alone. In order to be effective, counter-terrorism demands an understanding of the terrorist’s psychology, motivations and goals.¹³⁷ The challenge presented by the region’s geography requires the shared use of counter-terrorist assets to include intelligence and military force as well as international cooperation in policing and adhering to international laws and covenants.

¹³⁴ George T. J., 1980.

¹³⁵ Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, RAND 2003, Summary, p. 10.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Harry Henderson, 2001, p. 19.

International and transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah are violent groups that must be destroyed at their roots. Al-Qaeda is a particularly dangerous adversary because it is a remarkably adaptive and nimble organization. The fact that it can function on a number of different operational levels (with varying degrees of command and control from a central authority) also means that it does not have a single pre-determined modus operandi nor any single identified footprint. This is a partial reflection of the organizational and operational abilities, vision, attention to detail, and level of planning, patience, and finally business management acumen that Osama bin Laden has brought to the group in his role as its charismatic leader.¹³⁸

This constellation of characteristics was clearly evident in the enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks carried out by al-Qaeda on September 11th and eclipses anything we have previously seen in terrorism. Among the most significant characteristics of the operation were its ambitious scope and dimension: lethal coordination and synchronization; and the unswerving dedication and determination of the aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers, and crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the approximately three thousand persons within both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. However, not on the same scale, the Jemaah Islamiyah accomplished a similar feat in the Bali bombing of October 2002.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States shocked the world and resulted in a global campaign against terrorist group. Southeast Asian states, long considered the “Islamic periphery,” owing to their moderate Islamic stance, pluralism and nationalism, were suddenly forced to confront a small but patent terrorist threat in their midst, culminating in the 12 October 2002 terrorist attack on a Bali resort. Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda had entered the region beginning in the early to mid-1990’s, establishing independent cells and assisting and liaising with indigenous Islamic insurgencies that hitherto were believed to have solely domestic agendas. Al-Qaeda penetrated the region for more than a decade beginning in 1991, and al-Qaeda emerged in Southeast Asia at a time when state-sponsorship was waning.

¹³⁸ Response from Dr. Bruce Hoffman Vice President, External Affairs and Directors, RAND Washington Office The RAND Corporation 2002, p. 7.

Although the majority of the populations in Southeast Asia are nationalist and tolerant, radical Islam is growing for a variety of reasons including economic diversity, the lack of political freedom, the spread of Wahhabism and Salafi Islam, the failure of secular education, and the increased number of religious students studying in Middle Eastern. The main cause of radical Islam growth is the economic disparity in which a high gap between the rich and the poor created social jealousy. Accordingly, these conditions generated the terrorist and anarchy crimes as radical efforts to achieve a better social life. The specific circumstance in their respective economies was exacerbated by the regional economic crisis in 1997 to 1998. The aftermath of the crisis created severe poverty.

The regional economic crisis of 1997 to 1998 raised many questions concerning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) advocacy (much proclaimed between 1990 and 1997) of a shift in the global order toward a “pacific century” premised on the association’s practices of multilateral cooperation, dialogue, consensus, and non-interference. Does the aftermath of the economic crisis, and the new agenda posed by the forces of economic globalization and the seemingly irresolvable low intensity conflict that bedevils Southeast Asia requires radical re-thinking of the relevance of Asia’s security arrangements that are essentially the product of the Cold War era? This study examined this question by considering the curious external condition in which ASEAN rose to international prominence, and how ASEAN erroneously came to be seen in the 1990’s as an apparently new form of security cooperation, and finally how rising levels of violent internal challenges generated by the forces of globalization threaten Southeast Asia’s stability. It was quickly shown by the members of ASEAN that these forces have exposed ASEAN’s apparent incoherence as an imitation community and that it is ill equipped to contend with the threats exerted by a global information age.¹³⁹

Of course, the economic growth in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, has also generated grievances among groups whom development has left behind. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as in Singapore, the southern Philippines, and Southern

¹³⁹ David M. Jones and Mike L. Smith, “The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusion of Regionalism.”

Thailand where there are sizeable Muslim minorities, these grievances have combined to produce Islamist movements. Some of these radical movements seek to separate themselves from exploitative secular governments or to overthrow them. Others express in religious terms what are in reality worldly disputes with non-Muslim communities, such as rivalries over land right and access to jobs and livelihood.¹⁴⁰

In response, Southeast Asian governments have intensified security and intelligence cooperation. In this process, they have discovered that Islamist groups in the region have formed networks and cooperated in raising money. One group, Jemaah Islamiah, wants to establish “one great Islamic State” that would incorporate Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Mindanao-the Sulu region of the Philippines.

Despite the growing concern with Islamic extremism, Southeast Asian governments continue to treat this threat with only some regard. They fear that aggressive prosecution would radicalize more members of the Muslim community and render these Asian governments susceptible to charges of knuckling under to the United States.

To anticipate the emergence and the growing of terrorism both in Southeast Asia and around the world, the actors of the security apparatus must take measures against terrorism by making no concessions to terrorists, bringing terrorists to justice for their crimes, isolating and applying pressure on the states that sponsor and support them, and destroying the terrorists and their organizations. In addition, an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism must be established and maintained.

Cautiously, by recognizing that terrorism is caused by social and economic unrest, governments must eliminate the specific circumstances in their respective economies that fuel terrorism and must take the appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of funds to terrorists, including accelerating work on combating financial crimes. Furthermore, all economies must adhere to relevant international requirements for the security of air and maritime transportation. Transport ministers must actively and immediately enhance airport, aircraft, and port security. Strengthening energy security in

¹⁴⁰ Alfonso T. Yuchengco, *Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, *Pacific Forum CSIS Honolulu*, Hawaii, 2003, p. 1.

the region through the Energy Security Initiative, which protects against temporary supply disruption, is also required. Additionally, security in telecommunications, transportation, health and energy, must be improved. Custom communication networks and expeditious development of a global integrated electronic custom networks must be enhanced. This would allow customs authorities to better enforce laws while minimizing the impact on the flow of trade. This could be accomplished by developing an electronic movement record system that will enhance border security while ensuring that legitimate travelers are not inconvenienced. Economic building and technical cooperation to enable member economies to put into place and enforce effective counterterrorism measures is essential. Cooperation to limit economic fallout from the attacks and quicker restoration of economic confidence in the region through policies and measures that increase economic growth is also imperative. Government must also provide stable environment for trade, investment, travel and tourism.

A. THE DILEMMA OF U.S. POLICY

The diverse nature of terrorism and its association with a variety of groups and state sponsors preclude the design of any single counter-terrorist doctrine or strategy. Overreactions to terrorist events also encourage potential adversaries to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with such events to further their own interest in other regions of the world. The strategy used in countering incidents that can be absorbed with minimal or no damage to national security should be guided by a different set of responses than those to incidents that truly threaten vital U.S. interests. The first principle should be that U.S. initial response is relatively low-level, to avoid placing the United States at more risk or diverting resources needed for other functions.¹⁴¹

The dilemma imposed on the United States is how to design high-level policies for what are essentially low-level threats. An effective counterterrorist policy will require a reorientation in the way terrorism and its effects on this country are perceived. The following issues will have to be addressed:

- The tendency to equate terrorism with “crisis.”
- The roles that both the media and the government play in escalating the perceived terrorist threat.

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey D. Simon, *Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1987, p. 13.

- The possible negative long-range effects of viewing terrorism as war.
- The need to distinguish between those terrorist incidents that may threaten national security or geopolitical interest and those that do not.¹⁴²

There has been a tendency on the part of both the U.S. media and recent administration to categorize all terrorist incidents as a crisis. This automatically heightens the public's assessment of the threat. However, it is the reaction to terrorist incidents that often creates the real crisis. The emphasis placed on searching for a "solution" to the problem of terrorism may put more critical security issues, such as regional peace efforts and relations with key allies, at risk.

The tendency to view terrorism as "war" has also created problems in trying to develop an effective counterterrorist strategy. The vast array of possible terrorist assaults on American citizens and facilities worldwide obviously cannot all be considered acts of war. Therefore, guidelines must be formulated for determining whether a particular bombing, kidnapping, or hostage incident requires a military response. One consideration must be the difficulty of locating and attacking those responsible for a terrorist incident. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that innocent civilians will be killed in the retaliation process.

Further complicating the issue is the high probability that military preemptive or retaliatory strikes will cause the terrorist to respond with even greater violence or to attack targets of higher symbolic level. An escalating conflict between the U.S. military and terrorists worldwide would cause a war that could never be won, given the multitudes of terrorist groups that exist and their ability to reverse any counter-terrorist progress with one well-placed bomb.¹⁴³

A military response, moreover, must be delivered soon after the terrorist incident that provokes it. So, although a criminal investigation may continue with arrests coming years after the event, a military retaliation years after the event has little appeal or true punitive value.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁴³ Ibid., v.

¹⁴⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Terrorism: Policy Issues for the Bush Administration* (Santa Monica: RAND corporation, 1989, pp. 8-9.

B. THE REALISTIC VIEW OF SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Will terrorism increase in Southeast Asia? A continuing dialogue must focus on the nature of terrorism to permit international policy makers to move beyond the mere exchange of information and toward solid international cooperation. Terrorism, however defined, will not disappear unless a totally oppressive state is in place, and all forms of expression are subject to censorship.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the foremost principle must be the objective of the maintenance of the democratic process of government and the rule of law.¹⁴⁶

Perhaps the realistic view is that terrorism cannot be eradicated but merely contained. In order to construct a functional policy for dealing with terrorism, there must be, as a first step, a program that views terrorism as impermissible violence, whatever the motives when directed against any civilian target. There must also be a program that reduces the power of individual nations in determining those ground defenses that may be interposed against international terrorism extradition. Finally the most important item, each nation must execute a firm, irrevocable commitment to a neutral decision making body that will determine all the conditions for the international extradition of terrorists.¹⁴⁷

Given the widespread nature of terrorism and its links to different causes and issues, however, the prospect of significantly reducing the threat through any single response is questionable. Governments have had some measure of success in combating the terrorist threat within their own countries, but not worldwide. Many western observers agree that realistically the United Nations is not the best forum for cooperation against terrorism. In fact, from the U.S. point of view, the inability to agree on condemning terrorism has discredited the United Nations. In general, the larger number of actors involved, the more difficult it is to achieve cooperation in any area. This may already be, or may become, the problem that faces ASEAN. Given the universal scope

¹⁴⁵ Richard Allan, *Terrorism: Pragmatic International Deterrence and Cooperation*, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990, p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*, Zed Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 69.

¹⁴⁷ Allan, p. 55.

on UN treaties, as well as the controversial nature of terrorism, it is not surprising that international treaties are often ineffective because of less than enthusiastic support and reluctant implementation.

A set of principles is therefore necessary for an effective guide in forming antiterrorist policies. The formation of policy should be based on an analysis of successful tactics used in the past, together with basic assumptions about the sorts of actions acceptable to a democratic society. Broad policy guidelines should be capable of assisting decision making on a wide range of diverse policy issues.

A practical approach to isolating terrorism should focus on its unacceptable action regardless of the political cause it supports. The point should be made (and repeated) that no cause is well served by terrorism, which can only fail as a means of bringing about long term political change. Terrorism is most often damaging to the hopes of those who use it, not only because it provokes government repression but also because terrorism unites the public against it and brings a hard response. Terrorism, though difficult to precisely differentiate from other forms of violence, should be discredited as a method. Terrorism makes a tremendous noise, but compared to full-scale war it seems almost irrelevant. The danger of the regional and international terrorism, in other words, is not in the terrorist acts themselves, but in their potential to trigger wider and more dangerous armed conflicts. For this reason, it is important to prevent escalation, to resist state-sponsored terrorism from the beginning, and to avoid leading its sponsors into an even worse temptation.

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